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Two years ago, before starting graduate school at UNH, I couldn't even imagine
turning in a completed thesis. Granted: it's just a thesis, and likely no more than six
people will read it. But for two years, this was more than the capstone to my graduate
program. This was my Statement — my mark on the high-minded political science wall
I'd come to know and respect. It had to be perfect.

My variables had to be clearly

defined; they had to do exactly what I wanted them to do; and my theory had to explain
and describe exactly why. No other theory would suffice.
Then reality set in. There is no perfect study: some variables are hard to define
and they rarely do exactly what you want them to; and there is more than one way to
describe and explain it all. "Don't reinvent the wheel," my thesis advisor said, again and
again. "Just pick a theory and test it: if it works - great. If not, then you've added a little
bit to the scholarly debate." It seems less scientific than it is practical. But it was a way
out from what had become a set of lofty expectations for a novice political scientist.
When the Hooding Ceremony came and went and a job offer was extended to me
(God bless those alumni connections), it was clear to me and those around me that the
time had come to get it done and move on. I was absolved of having to write the perfect
thesis, and reminded that the best thesis is a done thesis. And so I got to work on the
case-study - the put up or shut up. There, my theory would be undressed (or supported)
by the facts, revealing how thin my argument was (or was not). Either way, the casestudy was the place I feared the most.

The month of June was a blur. As John Mellencamp says, "Days turn to minutes
and minutes to memories." But on the last day of the month, in the early hours of the
morning, I finished. Later that morning, I pieced together the bibliography, finished the
table of contents, and dashed to campus to print the whole thing off. Wasting paper never
felt so good. Less than two weeks later, I defended this thesis, which to my elation was
accepted pending only minor revisions. As one committee member put it, "you have
your life to live."
Submission of this thesis marks the unofficial end to two years of exciting, intense
and scary, but always rewarding research done in political science, international affairs,
foreign policy, and arms proliferation. I am ready to be called a "political scientist," a
dated yet high-minded title in an era of editorial, subjective analyses cloaked in the soiled
garments of an ostensibly objective news media.

I am ready to be above it all.
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ABSTRACT
POST-COLD WAR RUSSIAN FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN
By
Matthew T. York
University of New Hampshire, July, 2008
Thesis Committee Chairman: Dr. Lawrence C. Reardon, Ph.D.
Since 1989, Russia has armed and assisted Iran and other anti-Western states despite
improved relations with the West, non-proliferation agreements, and United Nations
sanctions. Such behavior apparently contradicts Russia's commitments to arms control
and international security and stability. Thus, this study seeks to clarify this contradiction
by conducting a crucial case-study of Russian military assistance to Iran from 2000
through 2007. It applies interest-group theory and hypothesizes that from late-2000 to
present day, interest groups successfully lobbied to increase defense-exports to Iran. It
also applies interest-group theory to Stephen J. Blank's 2007 analysis of Russia's
defense-export industry.

Though insightful, Blank's analysis lacks a theoretical

framework and a crucial case-study. Thus, in addition to determining the role of interestgroup lobbying in Russia's renewed Iran policy in 2000, this study also tests Blank's
argument that Putin-appointees in the military-industrial complex (MIC) have pushed for
defense-exports to Iran, then extracted rents from them.

September, 2008
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INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, the United States of America (U.S.) and the Soviet Union
provided foreign military assistance (FMA) to allies and non-state actors that were
sympathetic to their own national interests and were inimical to those of their geopolitical
rivals. Foreign military assistance to client-states in Africa, the Middle East, East Asia,
and Latin America enabled both superpowers to support friendly governments, maintain
military balances, support their military-industrial complexes (MIC), and assess their
weapons' effectiveness under wartime conditions. It also allowed them to engage their
rivals "by proxy" on foreign soil and without committing their nation's military. Thus,
arming and training one's geopolitical allies was the preferred manner by which the
superpowers engaged each other throughout the Cold War.
However, since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation and the West specifically, the U.S. - have continued their Cold War practice of arming and assisting
states that threaten each other's national interests and security.

For example, the

expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into the Former Soviet
Union (FSU) - itself a threat and an insult to Russia1 - has only exacerbated this trend.2
Subsequently, the dilapidated Russian military now faces FSU republics in Eastern

NATO expansion into the FSU not only threatens Russian territory, it may also base a disputed missile
shield, which Russian officials argue would neutralize its ballistic missile forces — not Iran's. NATO
expansion also reminds Russians who won and lost the Cold War.
2

NATO membership requires force-interoperability with other members. Thus, prospective FSU members
are obliged to transition their military forces from Soviet-era arms and hardware to those of Western
designs, a process from which the U.S. MIC has greatly benefited.

1

Europe, the Caucuses, and Central Asia that are armed with advanced, combat-proven
arms provided by their old enemy, the U.S. For its part, Russia has supplied arms and
assistance to its traditional client-states, like Libya, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria, which
have been hostile to the U.S., its allies, and its interests abroad. 3 It has also provided
FMA to former U.S. client-states, notably Iran and Venezuela, which are now hostile to
U.S. allies, interests, and security (if only rhetorically, in the case of Venezuela).
What makes Russia's post-Cold War defense-export policy worthy of further
analysis is that it has apparently continued its Cold War practice of arming and assisting
anti-American, anti-Western regimes prior to or during conflict. For example, Kornet-E
(NATO reporting name: AT-14 Spriggan) anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), night
vision goggles, Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers, and air-defense technicians
were allegedly sent to Iraq just before, and employed against the March 2003 U.S.-led
invasion. 4 Such provisions violated UNSC Resolution 687 5 and hindered coalition forces
in the first few weeks of the conflict. Soviet and Russian technology form the backbone
for North Korea's missile and nuclear programs, while Russian combat aircraft and small
arms and light weapons (SALW) have found their way to Myanmar, Sudan, and other
pariah-states. Most troubling is that, for nearly two decades, Russia has armed and assisted the Iranian military as the Islamic Republic has defied inter-national calls to suspend
uranium enrichment and fully disclose its nuclear activities. Such assistance — material
and technical — could be used against U.S. and Western militaries should it be determined

3

Though, only Syria remains hostile to U.S. regional and national interests, and remains on the U.S.
State Department's list of state-sponsor's of terrorism.

Bill Gertz, Treachery: How America's Friends and Foes Are Secretly Arming Our Enemies (New
York, New York, Crown Forum, 2004), 56-61.
5

Ibid.

2

that Iran's activities threaten regional and international security and must be neutralized.
The Russia-Iran Case-Study at a Glance
Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has been the world's second largest supplier of conventional arms, 6 but it has been Iran's primary supplier (see Figure 1),
exporting a total of $4,665 billion through 2007. The People's Republic of China comes
in second with $2,316 billion - slightly less than half of Russia's export volume. The
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Ukraine, and Poland come in
third, fourth, and fifth, respectively.
Figure 1: Sources of Iranian Arms Imports: 1989-2007

Figure 1: Source, "TIV of arms imports to Iran, 1989-2007," Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (Stockholm), March 31, 2008, http://armstrade.sipri.org/arms trade/values.php (accessed June 25,
2008). Note: Figures are SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) expressed in constant (1990) U.S. dollars.

In terms of volume, Russo-Iranian military-technical cooperation since 1989 has
been erratic. Figure 2 (next page) shows the trend indicator value (TIV) of Soviet, and
then Russian arms exports to Iran from 1989 through 2007 as report-ed by SIPRI. The
data indicates the yearly volume - measured in 1990 U.S. dollars - of exported/imported

6

Though, since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has led the world in conventional arms exports.

3

arms and military hardware. Foreign military assistance peaked in 1991 at $957 million,
then dropped sharply to $220 million in 1992. It rebounded in 1993 to $564 million, then
plummeted to $88 million in 1994. In 1995, it dropped further to just $42 million due to
the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement and the subsequent halt on additional arms contracts.
After a few years, trade volumes increased to $261 million in 1998, and ultimately to
$342 million in 2000. They began to decline in 2001 - ironically, the first full year of
renewed arms contracts. Thus, by 2002, arms volumes fell to $95 million and by 2004
and 2005, they fell to $14 million each year. But several MTC contracts were signed in
late 2005 and throughout 2006, sending volumes back up to $366 million - their highest
since 1993. However, they fell to $214 million in 2007.

Figure 2: Soviet/Russian Arms Exports to Iran: 1989-2007
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Figure 2: Source, "TIV of arms exports from USSR, 1989-2007" and "TIV of arms exports
1992-2007," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 31, 2008.
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Despite the variance in trade volumes, Moscow has had three discernible policies
on military-technical cooperation with Iran since 1989: (1) the Open Sales policy (late1989 to mid-1995), (2) the "No New Contracts" policy (mid-1995 to late-2000), and (3)
the Renewed Contracts policy (late-2000 to present).
Between December 1989 and June 1995, Moscow provided extensive militarytechnical assistance to Tehran, which, before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, was a major
ally and client of the U.S. and other Western nations. After the Revolution and through
the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian military attempted to keep its Western, 1960s and 70s-era
weapons in service — by illegally acquiring materials abroad and from manufacturing
reverse-engineered copies at home. After the war, it began to overhaul its exhausted and
largely obsolete military. Alienated from the West, Iran looked to the Soviet Union, and
then Russia, for modern arms, which the cash-strapped country happily sold. Thus, from
December 1989 through June 1995, Moscow sold anti-aircraft missiles, armored vehicles,
combat aircraft, submarines, tanks, and domestic-production licenses to Tehran. Russia
also helped to develop Iran's defense industry, missile and nuclear programs.
But on June 30, 1995, Russian officials ceased signing new defense contracts with
Iran. Under what would be dubbed the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, Russia would
complete delivery of arms and services already under contract to Iran by the end of 1999,
if the U.S. would launch commercial satellites on Russian rockets. 7 Thus, between 1996
and 1999, the fiscal value of Russian defense exports to Iran totaled just $200 million. 8

7

Wade Boese, "Putin Reaffirms Arms Sales, Nuclear Assistance to Iran," Arms Control Today, April 2001,
http://www.arniscontrol.org/act/2001__04/iran.asp (accessed March 16, 2007).
8

Boese, "Putin Reaffirms Arms Sales, Nuclear Assistance to Iran," 2001.

5

Despite this moratorium on new arms contracts, from 1998 through 2001, RussoIranian military-technical cooperation increased to $300 million.

In November 2000,

Russia withdrew from the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement and resumed arms sales
to Iran, which began a month later. In March 2001, Russian and Iranian officials signed
FMA agreements reportedly worth $6.7 billion. 9 Thus, between 2002 and 2005, the
financial value of Russia's arms sales to Iran increased nearly six-fold to $1.7 billion.10
Later agreements have been signed, bringing billions of dollars in revenue to Moscow;
advanced armaments to the Iranian military; and vital military-technical assistance in
developing Iran's ballistic missile programs and military-industrial complex.
Currently, Iran defies UN and U.S. demands to cease enriching uranium" and
sponsoring terrorism in Iraq and Israel. It also threatens to attack Israeli cities and U.S.
assets and disrupt the global oil supply if either attacks its nuclear facilities. Similarly,
Russia has defied arms control regimes, like the Missile Technology Control Regime
(MTCR), and has abrogated bilateral agreements, like the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, by arming and assisting Iran. Moreover, the possible sale of the S-300PMU-1
(NATO reporting name: SA-20A Gargoyle A) 12 and Pantsyr-SIE (SA-22 Greyhound) 13

9

Tor Bukkvoll, "Arming the Ayatollahs: Economic Lobbies in Russia's Iran Policy," Problems of
Post-Communism 49 (November/December 2002): 29, 38.
10
Lionel Beehner, "Russia-Iran Arms Trade," Council on Foreign Relations, November 1, 2006,
!lttril//www^cjfcorg/^
(accessed 15 March 2007).
11

Edmund Blair, "Iran Rules Out Halt to Sensitive Nuclear Work," Reuters, May 5, 2008,
bttp:/7www.reuters.coni/article/newsMaps/
idUSBLA52198020080505?pageNuraber=l&virtualBrandChanncM) (Accessed June 16, 2008).
12

"Iran Shields Its Nuclear Activities by Russian Missiles," Kommersant (Moscow), December 27, 2007,
http://www.kommersant.eom/p840222/i' 1/lran Air DefenseS-300/(Accessed March 13, 2008).
13
Jane's Defence Weekly Exclusive, "Iran to Acquire Advanced Air Defence System Via Syria,"
http://www.janes.com/press/features/pr070518 1 .shtml (Accessed July 29, 2008).
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mobile air defense Systems could also put Russia in violation of UNSC Resolution
1747. 14 Adopted March 27, 2007, Resolution 1747 "calls upon member states to refrain
from selling specific military materiel to Tehran," including missile systems. 15
What makes Russia's military-technical assistance to Iran problematic is that it is
a permanent member of the UN Security Council — the world body tasked with upholding
or restoring order vis-a-vis international crises. Yet, Russian assistance to Iran (and other
problematic states) seems to defy both the spirit of and its role on the Security Council, as
it rewards Iran's contentious, irresponsible behavior. It subsequently threatens Western
militaries, as Russia's military-technical assistance has, in part, helped Iran develop a
formidable offensive and defensive capability. Should fellow Security Council members,
like France, the U.K., and the U.S. attempt to neutralize Iran's nuclear program, they will
encounter 18 years of extensive Russian military-technical assistance. Russian officials
are surely aware of this. Thus, one must ask, why does Russia arm Iran?
By arming and assisting its anti-Western client-states during international crises,
Russia not only condones and rewards aggressive, irresponsible behavior, it also
perpetuates it. Moreover, some argue that Russia is engaging in the Great Power Games
and power-politics of the Cold War, when arming the enemy of one's enemy was the
preferred manner by which to hurt the enemy. But why would Russia continue with such
a policy? Is this a continuation, or a resumption of the power-politics, proxy-wars, and
zero-sum games of the Cold War? Or, is it something more typical of Russian domestic
politics in the globalized, post-Cold War environment?

15
United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1747 (2007), 2007, Prepared by the United Nations Security
Council [PDF] (New York, N.Y., 2007).

7

Broader Questions
The Cold War ended nearly 20 years ago. Russia, the U.S., and the West are no
longer ideological rivals; instead, they are complex, interdependent partners with shared
security concerns who, ostensibly, have little use for Cold War-era power-politics. Yet,
they apparently persist on both sides. Though this crucial case-study will analyze the
reasoning behind and resumption of Russia's post-Cold War foreign military assistance
to Iran in 2000, it will illuminate a broader question: are Russia and the U.S. engaging in
post-Cold War power-politics via their defense exports?
Overview of Thesis
Chapter one will discuss a critical piece of literature written on post-Cold War
Russian defense-export policy: Stephen J. Blank's Rosoboroneksport,

the arguments of

which this research will test. Because Blank's analysis lacks a theoretical framework,
Chapter one will then discuss two predominant theories — state-autonomous and rational
choice theories - as they relate to foreign policy questions. Specifically, it will crossexamine the state-autonomous theory and the interest group theory of government in
order to deduce the most applicable domestic-level theory for this case-study.

It will

arrive at the interest-group theory, and then seek to apply it to Blank's analysis of Putinera arms sales policy - particularly with regard to Iran.
Chapter two will provide the methodological framework for this study. It will
define the units and levels of analysis, and key variables. It will provide the argument's
justifications, strengths, and weaknesses, and suggestions for further study of the topic.
Chapter three will comprise the actual case-study. It will present a brief overview
of arms and service agreements signed between the Soviet Union (and then Russia) and

8

Iran, beginning in December 1989 and continuing through June 1995. It will then survey
goods and services provided to Iran - legally and illegally - through 1999, just before
Moscow shifted policy vis-a-vis Iran. It will then examine both Western foreign policy
institutes and Russian media sources from early 2000 to present day to measure (1) the
role of Russian interest-group lobbying in Russo-Iranian military-technical cooperation,
and (2) their effects of their lobbying (i.e., rent-seeking). It will analyze the subsequent
deals made in the context of Kremlin official statements, as well as regional and international developments, to determine approximately how much of a bearing those groups
had. Though this study works at the domestic level and takes as its units of analyses
domestic interest groups, it does not discount the role that international variables play.
Thus, it will measure domestic variables while controlling for systemic variables.
Finally, this study will present its findings. It will suggest alternative domesticlevel theories — such as corporate, elite, and rent-seeking theories — that future studies
could apply to the same topic. It will also suggest alternate levels of analysis - notably,
the international level — at which such studies could work. Because this study will work
entirely at the domestic level, it does not vet individual or international-level variables,
which many other studies have examined and have subsequently shown to contribute to
Russia's post-Cold War military-technical relations with Iran.
This study will also conclude with a list of policy recommendations which U.S.
officials may use to discourage Russia's provision of advanced conventional arms to, and
military-technical cooperation with Iran. The West's options are limited - though, they
are worth exploring, particularly as Iran's nuclear and regional activities continue to be
problematic, and the Russian defense industry tries to remain afloat.

9

CHAPTER I

TOWARDS AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

As Peter Gourevitch states, "If nations have choices, we need theories and
research that explains how countries make these choices." 16 As a result, there are multiple
theories on foreign policy at multiple levels of analysis — from the individual, to the
domestic, to the regional, to finally the international level. But, without discrediting most
theories and entire levels of analysis, this research will work at the domestic level and
analyze the role of special interest groups in Russia's defense exports to Iran since 2000.
Specifically, it will apply the interest-group theory of government to Stephen J. Blank's
analysis of Russia's defense-export industry and policies under President Vladimir Putin.
This research acknowledges that other scholars 17 have analyzed such policies at the international level. It grants such systemic explanations, yet supplements them with a grouporiented approach at the domestic level.
First, this chapter will analyze Blank's argument, distil its main points, and highlight its major weaknesses. Though groundbreaking and insightful, Blank's argument
must be theoretically examined, as it lacks a theoretical framework. Thus, this chapter
will then examine two opposing, yet potentially applicable domestic-level theories:

Peter Gourevitch, "Domestic Politics and International Relations," Handbook of International Relations,
ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage, 2002): 310.
17

Such as Eugene Rumer, Brenda Schaffer, and Ze'ev Wolfson.
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realism and rational choice theory. It will first offer a critique of Blank's argument using
Stephen D. Krasner's two realist criteria for empirically-inducing the national interest: (1)
distributed effect and (2) consistency.

Failing such criteria, it will illustrate how

realism's statist/state-autonomous theory is insufficient for describing and explaining
post-Cold War Russian defense-export policy.

This chapter will then move to the

rational choice literature where it will induce a theoretical framework for this research. It
will then arrive at the interest-group theory of government, which will later be applied to
Blank's analysis of Russia's defense-export policies and processes since 2000.
Rosoboroneksport: Stephen J. Blank's Analysis
Blank (2007) argues that since 2000, Russia's "conspicuous sale of weapons to
states who are openly or potentially anti-American [e.g., Venezuela, Syria, Iran]" 18
represent "an increasingly adversarial policy towards the U.S." 19 They are also zero-sum
for Russia: they "strike at U.S. interests while simultaneously advancing its own." 20 They
"include obtaining a foothold in the target state's defense and foreign policies and acquisition of revenues along with market share from these sales." 21 Other authors, like Ze'ev
Wolfson, 22 have provided similar, multi-level explanations for Russia's defense-export
policy. But unlike Wolfson, Blank analyzes the inner dynamics of the statist, top-down
paradigm, and argues that this contentious arms-export policy has emerged along with

Stephen J. Blank, Rosoboroneksport: Arms Sales and the Structure of Russian Defense Industry (Carlisle,
PA, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 1.
19

Blank, Rosoboroneksport,

20

Ibid.

21

Ibid.

22

Wolfson, "The 'Russian Factor' in the Military Balance in the Middle East."

1.
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"Russia's regression to an authoritarian, even autocratic system, a so-called 'managed
economy.'" 23 As such, arms are exported exclusively through Rosoboroneksport,
Russia's lone, state-owned and -controlled defense-exporter managed by Putin loyalists.
There are two tenets of Blank's argument: first, Rosoboroneksport "epitomizes
much of the unique Russian state supervision of industry as a whole," 2 and second, it
"represents the recrudescence of the tsarist or neo-Muscovite patrimony that survived
both tsarism and the Soviet epoch where it appeared." 26 Paraphrasing Grigory Yavlinsky,
Blank states that, "the entire economy operates within a system of informal, shadow
relationships, including a vast, equally informal government that must control or own all
property through control over resources and the judiciary." 27 Thus, "property rights are
either non-existent or at best conditional upon service to the state." 28 In return for their
service, stewards are allowed to extract rents from the defense-export process in the form
of bribes, corruption, kickbacks, and commissions. 29
Given such rent-seeking and granting among Putin's appointees - most of which
hold stock, or executive positions within Russian defense companies — this paradigm
inevitably blurs the line between Kremlin apparatchiks30 pursuing the national interest or

23

Ibid.

24

Notably Putin's colleagues from the security services who now direct Russia's commercial, economic,
and political activities — the so-called Chekisty.
25

Ibid, 4.

26

Ibid, 5.

27

Ibid. A Russian economic and political figure.

12

their special interests. Thus, despite Putin's lofty claim that arms exports during his
tenure are meant, in part, 31 to further Russia's national interests, they have apparently
fallen victim to myriad rent-seekers in and out of the Kremlin.
In sum, Blank argues that Putin-era defense-export policy follows a Statist, topdown paradigm which increasingly resembles neo-Muscovite, Soviet, and even tsarist
models of state ownership, management, and elite-patrimony. By virtue of its structure,
Russia's defense-export industry rewards elite functionaries for their loyalty to the State
by permitting them to extract rents from the defense-export process.

Though rent-

seeking and -granting occurred to varying degrees during the Yeltsin-era (i.e., in the form
of companies lobbying for arms sales abroad, or conducting them in contravention of
Russian policy), such activities during the Putin-era are fundamentally different.

Here,

elite patronage, rent-seeking, and unscrupulous business activities are bi-products of
Putin's tenuous reward system; they are payment for advancing Russia's national interest.
Ironically, such patronage, rent-seeking and rent-granting detract from Russia's national
interests, while they further the various special interests in and out of the Kremlin. Thus,
Russians might very well have traded one kleptocracy for another, more charismatic one.
Weaknesses
As insightful as Blank's argument appears, it has two critical pitfalls. First, Blank
is unclear about why Putin has engaged in elite patrimony, and why his appointees are
then allowed to seek rents. Is it because Putin is "taking care of his own" (they mostly

' A colloquial Russian term for an unqualified bureaucrat or a political-appointee.
Russia's energy industries — also state-owned and -controlled - are the other means by which Putin is
trying to further Russia's national interests.

13

come from the security services), or because they helped Putin win the 2000 presidential
election? It is a cliche in politics that "to the victor go the spoils." However, it may apply
here. Since 2000, Putin has appointed colleagues and confidantes from the KGB, and its
successors [the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Foreign Intelligence Service
(SVR] in executive-level positions in both government and industry. As a result, Andrei
Belyaninov, Sergei Chemezov, Sergei Ivanov, Victor Ivanov, and Mikhail Dmitriev have
clearly benefited — financially and politically — from Putin's rise to power.
It may also be that Putin's appointees in the defense industry and the so-called
power ministries (siloviki) — members of his "winning coalition"

— are being repaid for

helping Putin win the presidency in 2000. Tor Bukkvoll (2003) argues as such, drawing
on the winning coalition literature expounded by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James
Lee Ray. He argues that in exchange for their support, Putin has included members in his
close, inner policy-making circle while rewarding others with pure material payoff.33
Coming full circle, Putin's patrimonial, rent-seeking system as characterized by Blank
may be Putin's attempt to reward his "winning coalition." By extension, renewed arms
contracts with Iran may ultimately be Putin's payoff to this coalition.
Second, Blank's analysis lacks a theoretical framework and a crucial case-study,
compelling this research to find a suitable theory to describe and explain Putin's defenseexports to Iran and other pariah-states. This is no small task, as Blank describes and explains relationships between the state and society that, on the surface, resemble a statist,
top-down paradigm. However, as the research digs deeper, it uncovers relation-ships that
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suggest societal, bottom-up paradigms (i.e., bureaucratic, corporate, elite, interest-group,
rent-seeking, and winning-coalition theories). Thus, the following section will examine
these opposing theoretical bodies, starting with realism and moving to rational choice.
Towards an Analytic Framework
Realism: Statist, or State-autonomous theory
Realists, notably Stephen D. Krasner, view the state as a viable, "autonomous
actor" 34 that is insulated from special-interest groups and sets policy independent from
them. Krasner's seminal, realist critique of raw materials investments and U.S. foreign
policy, Defending the National Interest, provides a statist theory (also known as the stateautonomous; state-centric) for explaining and describing foreign policy. 35 Under a statist
paradigm, "the objectives sought by the state cannot be reduced to some summation of
private desires." 36 Instead, they are called "the national interest." 37
For Krasner, a state's strength vis-a-vis societal groups — "ranging from weak to
strong" 38 - determines how insulated it is from those groups, 39 and ultimately how effectively it advances its national interests. Most "capitalist or market-economy countries" 40
fall into one of "three ideal-typical relationships between the state and society:"41 weak,

Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign
Policy (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1978): 6.
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moderate, and strong states. To some extent, all can advance their national interests
because they all can resist private pressures. Unlike weak states, moderate states can
change private behavior; however, they cannot change social structures.

Only strong

states can resist private pressures and change both private behaviors and social structures. 42 Thus, strong states can more effectively advance their national interests.
According to Krasner, a state's national interests can be determined by one of two
methods: (1) Logical-Deduction, and (2) Empirical-Induction.

As logical-induction is

less consistently applicable to foreign policy issues than empirical induction, the latter is
the preferred method. Using empirical-induction, "the national interest is induced from
statements and behavior of central decision-makers. If their preferences meet two basic
criteria, they can be called the national interest." 43

First, policy-initiatives "must be

related to general objectives [e.g., economic growth, national security, etc], not to the
preferences or needs of any particular group or class, or to the private power drives of
officeholders." 44 Second, such policies "must persist over time." 45
Applying Krasner's First Criterion
According to Krasner, policy must "affect the whole community" 46 if it furthers
the national interest. Also, "if there are gains from a policy, these must not always accrue
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to a particular group or class," 47 while losses "must not always fall on a particular group
or class." 48 Lastly, "the preferences of central decision-makers must not be directed
solely to their own personal interests, if they are to be termed the national interest."49
Applying Krasner's first criterion to Blank's analysis of post-Cold War Russian
foreign military assistance policy, the research reveals that the "gains" from the resulting
sales (i.e., profits and revenues) have had little positive impact on Russia's economy or
national security sectors (i.e., the defense industry and the military). Indeed, Russia's
economic upturn owes more to the rise in energy prices since Putin took office than to its
defense exports. Meanwhile, the defense industry struggles to procure modern, reliable
arms 50 - even for the export market. 51 As a result, Russia's military continues to atrophy,
as maintenance and manpower costs sap funds for modernization and procurement. 52
However, as Blank argues, there are several sectors of Russian society - notably,
Rosoboroneksport (Russia's sole, state-owned defense-export company), the Ministry of
Defense (MoD), and Kremlin actors, including Putin, himself - that, by design, benefit
more from defense exports than the economy or the military.
Since President Putin consolidated the defense-export sector in November 2000,
most defense companies have exported arms, goods, and services through Rosoboroneksport. For its services to the state, Rosoboroneksport earns a 3.8 percent commission
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from all sales

and is obligated to transfer between 10 and 50 percent of export revenues

to the federal budget. 34 However, Blank cites data showing that in 2001 - Rosoboroneksport's first full year of operation — it had "transferred only 4 percent of its net income
to the federal budget." 55 The Russian Federation's Accounting Chamber not only cited
"irregularities" in Rosoboroneksport's financial procedures, but also claimed that "the
framework of its activity was so convoluted it defied meaning ful control." 56

Such

negligible revenue transfers and irregular accounting have impacted the state defense
order. By November 2005 — five years after the creation of Rosoboroneksport — Defense
Minister Sergei Ivanov, himself, admitted "that defense allocations were falling short of
needs, with the Navy and Air Force particularly lacking in supplies." 57 Thus, between 70
and 80 percent of the Russian Military's equipment was viewed obsolete. 58
According to Blank, such malfeasance is nothing new to the Russian MIC. "It is
well known that, for both President Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, the arms sales
organization served as a slush fund by means of which unaccountable funds went straight
to the President for unspecified political purposes." 59 Moreover, "many of the funds that
accrue personally to Sergei Chemezov, the director of Rosoboroneksport, and his key
subordinates are equally untraceable. In return, these servitors must carry out policies
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made atop the government machine." 60 Thus, commissions, funds, and revenues "are
merely among the more visible examples of rents accruing to key state players from the
of weapons abroad." 61 The more opaque examples include inter- and intra business
governmental bribes, kickbacks, corruption, and financial and political favors secured by
executives and governmental officials.62
Thus, to increase Rosoboroneksport's efficiency, transparency, and ultimately its
contributions to the state defense budget, Putin initiated three military-industrial reforms
in 2004, one of which was to subordinate Rosoboroneksport beneath the Ministry of
Defense. 63 This move gave Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov and his subordinates control
over the defense-export industry and access to its profitable system of rent-seeking and
granting. 64 Moreover, with Ivanov now chairman of the board of directors of the United
Aircraft Corporation (OAK) — a state-owned holding-company for all major Russian
aerospace companies 65 — he and his subordinates have an added financial incentive to
push for arms exports abroad.

As one analyst put it, "It would be like if Donald

Rumsfeld were on the board of directors of Lockheed Martin." 66
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In all, despite the stated goals of Russia's defense-export industry - economic
growth and defense-industrial restoration 67 - those directing or associated with industry
are poised to benefit more than the economy, the defense industry, the military, or the
state. Thus, Krasner's first criterion for inducing the national interest - policy affecting
all, rather than some - does not apply to Blank's analysis of Putin-era defense-exports.
Furthermore, this criterion is mutually exclusive, given the relationship between
the defense industry and the state in capitalist economies. Regarding Russia's defense
industry, even if it were to receive sufficient funds from arms exports and were to fulfill
domestic defense orders, there would still exist a mutually beneficial relationship
between itself and the state. But Russia is not a red herring; this is true of all defense
industries in capitalist economies, where national security is a public service provided by
private industry.

However, while most state's defense industries further their special

interests while advancing the national interest, according to Blank, Russia's defense
industry furthers their special interests at the expense of the national interest.

Thus,

Krasner's first criterion - policy affecting all, not some - is not only inapplicable to
Blank's analysis of Russia's defense industry, it is perhaps inapplicable to all cases
involving domestic defense industries in capitalist economies.
Krasner's Second Criterion
Applying Krasner's second criterion for inducing the national interest - persistent
policy-implementation — this research finds that Russia's defense-export policy vis-a-vis
Iran has been inconsistent. It has gone through three distinct phases: open sales (December 1989 - June 1995); restricted sales (June 1995-November 2000); and renewed sales
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(December 2000 - present). As Krasner writes, "when confronted with a similar problem
at a different time, leaders might choose another ordering of goals." 68 Such ordering
might "change from one administration to another," 69 but this "would not be consistent
with the notion that" such a policy furthered the national interest.
Moscow's military-technical cooperation with Tehran began in December 1989
and increased through the mid-1990s.

In June 1995, Russian Prime Minister Viktor

Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice-President Al Gore agreed that Moscow would halt signing
further arms contracts with Tehran. It allowed arms and services under contract at the
time of the agreement to continue, but required them to conclude by the end of 1999.
Thus, while bilateral military-technical cooperation continued through 1999, it dipped
sharply from 1995 through 2000.
However, on November 3, 2000 - a day before Putin created Rosoboroneksport Putin abrogated the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement and pledged to renew arms negotiations with Iran. Then in March 2001, President Putin and Iranian President Mohammed
Khatami signed a multi-year, multi-billion dollar agreement that renewed their bilateral
relationship for the 21 s t century. Since then, Russia has transferred dozens of high-tech
weapons platforms to Iran, including air defense systems, ground attack aircraft, and
multi-role helicopters. It has also provided Iran with anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles,
aircraft engines, and technical assistance in developing its domestic arms industry and
modernizing its largely Western military. Thus, Russia's military-technical cooperation
with Iran has been inconsistent.

Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 44.
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Also, Moscow has inconsistently defined its military-technical cooperation with
Iran since it renewed in late-November 2000. That month, Andrei Nikolayev, Chairman
of the State Duma Committee for Defence, stated that renewed MTC with Iran would
"bring political advantages, above all," 70 but also noted that "Iran is a solvent country,
which will be paying in cash." 71 Similarly, General Anatoly Kvashnin, head of the Russian General Staff, stated that Russia would expand its MTC "with any countries if it
benefits Russia, benefits its defensive capability, among other things."
More recently, though, Russian officials have defined their MTC with Iran in
strict geopolitical terms. At the February, 2007 Munich Conference on Security, Defense
Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov stated that the sale of 29 Tor-Mi
short-range air-defense (SHORAD) systems to Iran were "designed for the defence of
that country." 73 Similarly, Mikhail Dmytriyev, head of the Federal Service for MilitaryTechnical Cooperation (FSVTS), stated that their "mission is to protect a specific facility" 74 - i.e., the Busheher nuclear power plant. Putin stated "We have done this so that
Iran should not feel cornered or [sic] that is in some hostile surrounding and understand
that he has a channel for communication and friends who can be trusted." 75
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In sum, there is much vacillation among statements made by top Kremlin officials
regarding Russia's defense-export motives and policies - from general policy to specific
deals with specific client-states. Such inconsistency further weakens the Statist claim
that Russia's foreign military assistance policy serves the national interest - particularly
since Russian officials are not in agreement about what interests they advance. Taken
together - Russia's inconsistent post-Cold War defense-exports to Iran and the Kremlin's
conflicting statements vis-a-vis such exports - this research finds that Russia's defenseexport policy fails Krasner's second criterion for inducing the national interest. Thus,
if the goals of central decision-makers are transitory, shifting in importance
from one case to another, a bureaucratic-politics or group-oriented approach
would be more appropriate: these models predict vacillations in the preferences of governmental actors because the influence of different bureaus or
societal groups changes from one issue to another. 76
In light of Krasner's recommendation, this research turns to rational-choice theory
for its analytic framework. It will discuss the works of Marceau, LaPalombara, Schattschneider, and Olson. It will build on Schattschneider's groundbreaking work on interest-group theory and utilize Olson's conception of special-interest groups (sometimes
called distributional coalitions), as well as how they operate within society.

Olson's

work is critical here because it will connect the interest-group literature to the rent-seeking literature, just as Stephen J. Blank does in his analysis of Russia's defense-export
industry. Paradoxically, this will allow the research to delineate between interest-group
lobbying and the costs of such lobbying within Russia's defense-export industry - two
different variables - which will help ensure internal validity for this study.
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Rational Choice Theory: Interest-group theory of Government
Unlike realism, which views the state as an autonomous actor and policy from the
top down, rational choice theory's basic unit of analysis is the group and views policy
from the bottom up. Policy is then viewed as a competition among various groups —
bureaucratic, economic, political, social, and others. 77 As a result, "Government institutions merely process inputs and outputs." 78 Also, rational choice theories - the interestgroup theory, in particular - treat the state as "a set of formal structures, not an autonomous actor.

There is no cohesive center of decision-making." 79 Thus, "the locus of

power may move from one bureau to another, from one branch of government to another,
depending on the interests and resources associated with particular issues." 80
The Interest-Group Theory of Government
According to Oliver Garceau (1958), there has been an effort in the scholarly
literature to create a broad theory which considers the group the central or sole building
block in the political process 81 and accounts for all resultant policy. "To do this, it is
necessary in effect to give the group tag to many different kinds of social relationships
and interactions." 82 Garceau, and then LaPalombara (1960) note that "the trouble with
this 'theory' is that the data from the field do not confirm it." 83 As a result, scholars have
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included not only interest groups in the model, but also the groups with which members
associate (i.e., "reference groups"), and groups "that may, if put under stress, serve as the
basis for organized political activity" (i.e., "potential groups"). 84 However, as Garceau
notes, "The search for such a complete theory of the group basis of politics may be
stretching too far for theoretical elegance" 85 at the expense of "an analytical tool."
Indeed, such a broad notion of interest-group theory makes for an awkward, bulky, and
non-parsimonious theory that decreases in utility as it increases in scope.
Thus, "we must see interest groups as parts of whole political processes" 87 - as
opposed to political processes, themselves. In other words, interest groups must be conceived as singular actors in the democratic political process - along with the executive,
judicial, and legislative branches, and the electorate — seeking to affect that process. On
the strength of this more parsimonious theory, a number of key assumptions, concepts,
and propositions regarding interest groups are evident, including:
A. A group's influence vis-a-vis its competitors will vary with the proportion of the total membership in its specialized area that it [can] organize.
B. Although formal organization is not essential to an interest group, all
other things being equal, organization is in itself an independent variable affecting the degree of success a group can have in influencing
decisions or policies.
C. A group's ability to intervene efficaciously in governmental decisions
affecting it varies directly with the nature of the group's access to
decisional information.
D. Bureaucratic agencies differ in the degree to which they are penetrable

S3

Joseph LaPalombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest-Group Theory in Non-American Field
Situations," Journal of Politics 22 (1960), 31.
84

Garceau, "Interest Group Theory in Political Research," 106.

85

Ibid.

86

Ibid.

87

Ibid, 111. Italics mine.

25

E.
F.

G.
H.
I.

by organized groups. Responsiveness to group demands will be maximized in those agencies that are newer and more functionally specialized.
All other things being equal, decision makers will favor those group representatives or negotiators who evidence life experiences (social origin),
social class, education, etc.) similar to those of the decision makers.
Interest groups will be ineffective in the degree to which the concept of
the "public interest" is a strongly held myth by the governmental decision makers.
Interest groups will be more active in public administrative areas in
those countries displaying the highest degree delegated legislation.
The administrative role, as such, limits the influence of interest groups
because, like all roles, it involves required, permitted and forbidden
behavior.
The power of any sample of politically active groups (on any given series of issues) will vary with a) the political "styles" of the groups, b)
the reference groups of the bureaucrats, and c) the structure and processes of the bureaucracy. 88

Subsequent case studies that have applied interest-group theory to policy formulation "have focused attention on nexus points of decision making where interest groups
are seen in context." 89 Thus, as Krasner writes, "In its most simplified and schematic
form, interest group theories view politics as a vector diagram in which a series of pressures are brought to bear on the state, which then moves in the direction it is pushed by
the strongest societal forces." 90
Perhaps the most well-known application of interest-group theory to public policy
is E. E. Schattschneider's Politics, Pressures, and the Tariff.

Schattschneider (1935)

argues that the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 was "a product of the desires of a multiplicity of economic actors." 91 As a result, "Government policy was simply a summation

LaPalombara, "The Utility and Limitations of Interest-Group Theory in Non-American Field Situations,"
35.
89

Qarceau, "Interest Group Theory in Political Research," 107.

90

Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 26.

91

Garceau, "Interest Group Theory in Political Research," 107.

26

of private goods."

Schattschneider's argument implies that "government policy is a

reflection of whatever groups have power in society. The concept of the public interest
slips away." 93 Thus, interest-group theory posits that "the public or national interest can
only mean some summation of private interests." 94
Towards a Theory of Rent-Seeking
While Schattschneider illustrates that special-interest groups can infiltrate public
policy for private gain, Olson (1971; 1982) illustrates how. He argues that organized
interest groups rationally serve their "members' interests by obtaining a larger share of
the society's production [i.e., budgets, likened to pies] for the organization's members"
while giving nothing back to society.

They are "utility maximizers" — i.e., the more

profit they can make, the better. Far from being altruistic, they are capitalistic profiteers
that interfere with a state's ability to institute policy and advance the national interest.96
Olson argues that interest groups can obtain more of the budgetary pie either by
increasing its overall size (while holding proportions constant), or "by obtaining larger
shares or slices."

7

Groups rarely attempt to increase the social pie's overall size, as this

requires them to expend significant resources in exchange for minimal gains. Instead,
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they seek a larger slice of the pie. 98 But, to pursue this larger slice, groups must divert
resources from producing the social output "they produced in their previous employments," which "will reduce social output to some extent." 99 Though they are part of this
society and will endure the costs of their own greed, they have conducted a cost-benefit
analysis and have determined that the benefits of their actions will outweigh the costs.
They have made the "rational choice" to pursue their self interest at the expense of the
national interest.

Moreover, "the typical organization for collective action will do

nothing" 101 to recoup such expenses. As Olson states, "The familiar image of the slicing
of the social pie does not really capture the essence of the situation; it is perhaps better to
think of wrestlers struggling over the contents of a china shop." 102
As a result, interest groups are "overwhelmingly oriented to struggles over the
distribution of income and wealth rather than to the production of additional output - they
are 'distributional coalitions' (or organizations that engage in...'rent-seeking')." 103 Distributional coalitions "are essentially free-riders: it is in their framework not to pay, yet
they still reap social benefits." 104 Thus, "they are a drag on budgets" 105 and inhibit the
state from pursuing the national interest, particularly in weak or semi-democratic states 106
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(e.g., the Russian Federation, 1992-present). "This will be expedient," Olson writes,
"even if the social costs of the change in the distribution exceed the amount redistributed
by a huge multiple; there is for practical purposes no constraint on the social cost such
an organization will find it expedient to impose on the society in the course of obtaining a
larger share of the social output for itself"
Similarly, Gordon Tullock (1971) "focused on the resource cost of competitive
lobbying of politicians and bureaucrats, both by those who seek to extract government
transfers and by those who seek to prevent [them]." 108 Tullock found that regardless of
who wins the political or bureaucratic struggle, "the resources invested...are wasted and
society as a whole is worse off."109 That rent-seeking happens in government is a certainty. However, scholars are less certain about how to measure such rent-seeking — if it can
be measured at all. Anne Krueger (1974) notes that "the value of rents associated with
import licenses can be relatively large." 110 And though "import licenses constitute a large
and visible rent resulting from government intervention, the phenomenon of rent-seeking
is far more general." 111 Thus, as Robert Tollison (1998) states, "there exists no clear
agreement in the literature about how to model rent-dissipation processes, and so there is
no clear agreement about whether such costs bulk large or small in real economies."
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The Way Forward
Though "the social costs of rent seeking (Tullock 1967) forms the normative
backdrop for the interest-group theory of government," 113 it is separate from the theory,
itself. Indeed, as Tollison (1998) states, interest-group theory concerns lobbying, while
rent-seeking theory concerns "the costs of lobbying." 114

Bearing this distinction, this

research recalls the original research question: why does Russia arm Iran? It also recalls
Stephen J. Blank's analysis of the Russian defense-export industry under Putin, which
illuminates a patrimonial, self-serving culture of military-industrial lobbying, rent-seeking, and rent-granting. According to Blank, defense exports to Iran and other Russian
client-states ostensibly represent the state pursuing its national interests. But since there
are various rewards for the "stewards" of this process, there are also various incentives
for them to lobby and seek rents at the expense of the national interest. Kremlin apparatchiks can now operate from within, turn the national interest on its head, and "wag the
dog" in pursuit of their various special interests. Thus, this research will apply interestgroup theory to Blank's analysis of Russia's defense-export policy to determine if it can
link his general argument to Russia's military-technical relationship with Iran.
Though interest-group theory has mostly been applied to domestic policy, it is
applicable to foreign policy "when economic issues are at stake." 115

Defense-export

policy is one such issue. Here, there are clear links between policy and special interests —
i.e., the defense industry.

Indeed, as Krasner states, "Commercial agreements usually
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have a very salient impact on particular actors and a diffuse impact on the society as a
whole." 116 Under such circumstances, interest-group theory suggests that Russia's
defense-export policy vis-a-vis Iran has been strongly affected by interest groups and will
most likely "reflect the demands of particular social groups."
By default, this study will not analyze the costs of lobbying within Russia's military-industrial complex (i.e., rent-seeking's impact on its defense industry, economy,
military, and national security). Future studies could examine such costs and attempt to
make connections. Furthermore, bureaucratic, corporate, elite, rent seeking and winning
coalition theories may describe and explain Russia's defense-exports to Iran under Putin
as well as interest-group theory. Therefore, this research does not attempt to discredit
any one of them over the other. But because prior studies applied interest-group theory to
Yeltsin-era defense exports to Iran, it seems natural to pick up where they left off. Also,
Krasner proffers a group-centric theory when a state's foreign policy fails to meet his
criteria for inducing the national interest. Thus, not only will this research test Blank's
argument using interest-group theory, it will also determine if the theory is still applicable
to Russo-Iranian military-technical relationship.
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CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Rationale/Purpose
This study's purpose is to clarify Russia's post-Cold War defense-exports to Iran
and other anti-Western states in order to determine Russia's place in the post-Cold War,
and, more importantly, the post-9/11 environment.

After the Berlin Wall fell, it was

believed that the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, would cease the
great power games of the Cold War and refrain from arming anti-Western regimes that
threaten regional and international security.

However, Russia has not only continued

arming its Cold War-era client-states, like Syria, North Korea, and Iraq, it has also armed
anti-Western or potentially anti-Western regimes in China, Iran, and Venezuela.

For

Western policy makers and military planners, alike, this is problematic — particularly as
several of Russia's client-states possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and sponsor terrorism. Thus, one must ask: why does Russia arm hostile, anti-Western regimes?
Is this an example of Russia pursing its national interests, or have special-interest groups
again infiltrated the Kremlin? Finally, given its problematic proliferation in the post-9/11
world, can Russia be considered a Western ally in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)?
Contribution
This study contributes to the field of political science and international relations
by adding to literature on post-Cold War Russian foreign and foreign military assistance
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policy.

Yet, unlike much of the literature, which provides various statist, top-down

explanations, 118 this study will provide a societal, bottom-up explanation. In addressing
these questions, it will build upon previous studies that have used corporations, elites,
and/or interest groups as their units of analysis, but have provided inconclusive or
insufficient explanations. 119 But, it will mostly test Stephen J. Blank's 2007 analysis of
Russia's defense-export industry vis-a-vis its arms exports to Iran. Though groundbreaking and insightful, it lacks a theoretical framework. Thus, his argument is questionable
and deserves further scrutiny before it can be accepted as a viable domestic-level, groupcentric approach.
Research Questions
The Cold War ended nearly two decades ago. Russia and the West are no longer
ideological rivals, but instead are economic partners with a common enemy in Islamic
terrorism. However, just as the Berlin Wall fell, Russia and Iran began a contentious,
multi-dimensional, and mutually beneficial relationship that has threatened Western
allies, interests, and security. Thus, one has to ask (R.Q.): why does Russia arm Iran? Is
it a top-down dynamic driven in pursuit of the state's national interest? Or, is it a bottomup dynamic driven in pursuit of special interest? Either way, what can U.S. and Western
policy-makers do to counter the Kremlin's contentious arms trading behaviors?
Hypotheses
To answer these questions, the following hypotheses will be tested.

However,

two basic assumptions about the period from 2000 through present must be made: first,

Such as Robert Freedman, Eugene Rumer, Brenda Shaffer, and others.
Such as Tor Bukkvoll, Victor Mizin, Roma Tsvang and Ze'ev Wolfson.

33

that Iran's military and political leaders have always sought foreign military assistance either conventional arms, military-technical cooperation, or both; and second, that
Russian bureaucratic and business institutions, if not the state or political leadership, have
always been willing to provide Iran with such assistance. Thus, both the demand- and
supply-sides of the Iranian-Russian equation must be held constant.
This study's hypotheses (below) will test interest-group influence on, and activity
within Russia's post-Cold War foreign military assistance policy towards Iran since 2000.
Did the special interests find their way back into Russia's Iran policy in 2000? Have they
pushed Russia's arms exports to Iran since, or do such exports reflect Russia pursuing its
national interests? Finally, can rent-seeking behaviors account for Russian arms and
assistance to Iran? The following hypotheses seek to answer these questions.
HO: If interests groups do not lobby for arms sales, then sales will not increase.
H I : If interest groups lobby for arms sales, then sales will increase.
H2: If interest groups seek rents from arms sales, then sales will increase.
Unit/Level of Analysis
This study will work within the domestic level of analysis; its units will be
special-interest groups. The domestic level is best for this research design because much
of the literature concerning post-Cold War Russian foreign military assistance to Iran and
other anti-Western states treats the issue at this level - particularly Stephen J. Blank's
analysis. Thus, there is a substantial precedence for such a study. Also, since
Russian FMA to Iran and its other client-states is an extension of Russia's overall foreign
policy, it is necessary to look at the domestic determinants of this policy. Finally, the
domestic level is best for this study because
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the international variables that could have caused changes in Russia's arms
policy have been relatively constant through the period under investigation:
Iran has not changed in a way that would substantially affect Russian strategic perceptions, U.S. political pressure not to sell arms has been unremitting, and the Iranian desire to purchase Russian [weapons] of almost any
kind is also unchanged. Thus there are good reasons to look for domestic
reasons for the policy changes.120
The only events that would have affected Russia's defense-exports to Iran vis-avis the West and the U.S. are the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Given that
Russia has faced a militant Islamic threat in Chechnya since the early 1990s, one would
have expected Russian foreign policies to have become more cooperative with Western
and U.S. security policies. That they have not is suggestive - though, not necessarily
indicative — of a foreign policy-agenda that is decidedly different from, if not hostile to,
Western and U.S. interests. Thus, knowing where Russia stands vis-a-vis arms control
and proliferation issues will identify where it sits in the post-Cold War and post-9/11
world vis-a-vis the West.
Methodology
This study will conduct a crucial case-study 121 of Russia's defense exports to Iran
since Vladimir Putin took office in 2000 - specifically, Stephen J. Blank's 2007 analysis
of Russia's defense-export industry. It will apply the interest group theory of government
to his analysis to determine: (1) if there is any evidence to support his arguments, (2) if
interest-group theory is a viable theoretical framework for his study, and (3) if interestgroup theory explains and describes Russia's defense-exports to Iran under Putin as well
as it does under Yeltsin.

121

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences, (Cambridge, MA; MIT Press, 2005), 32-33.
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A crucial case-study is best suited for this research design, as the specifics of the
Russia-Iran defense-export dynamic make it difficult to be quantified and statistically
studied. How does one quantify interest group power and influence? Or foreign policy
decision-making vis-a-vis corporatist, elitist, or individual interest-group pressure? Thus,
a qualitative analysis will account for Russia's nuanced economic, political, and social
environments and achieve high internal validity vis-a-vis its foreign and foreign military
assistance policies. However, to ensure high external validity, the proposed hypotheses
are generally stated so that they may be applied to additional Russian client-states, as
well as to Western client-states.
However, because Russia's economic, political, and social environments are so
complex, accurately and thoroughly conducting a qualitative analysis may be difficult.
Access to accurate, relevant, and unbiased information may also be difficult.

This

research grants that because many Russian media outlets are state-owned, or are owned
by Kremlin loyalists, finding reliable, unbiased information may be difficult.

Kremlin-

controlled newspapers may be reluctant to report that special-interest groups continue to
influence or set foreign policy. Conversely, Western academic and news outlets may too
readily report that such interests have crept back into policy. Thus, control-ling for media
bias will be one of this study's greatest challenges.
Data
Policy-related data will be collected from translated, online Russian daily newssources, such as Interfax, Itar-Tass, and Kommersant.

They will be accessed primarily

through World News Connection, the online, full-text database of foreign news reports
collected by the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Scholarly discussions on Russian

36

defense-export policies and practices will be culled from academic journals, such as The
Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA), Problems in
and Strategic Analysis.

Post-Communism,

However, the marquise resource for this study will be Stephen J.

Blank's Rosoboroneksport:

Arms Sales and the Structure of Russian Defense Industry, a

monograph published by the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College.
Yearly statistical data on Russian arms sales to Iran will primarily be culled from
defense and international security think-tanks, notably the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), but also the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Information on recent,
ongoing, or future Russian FMA to Iran will primarily be culled from weekly defense
publications, like Jane's Defence Weekly and other reliable mainstream media sources.
Key Variables
Dependent Variable: Foreign Military Assistance (see operationalization, below)
Independent Variables: Interest Groups
Control Variables: a) National Interest
b) Non-state actors (e.g., illegal arms dealers)
c) Rent-Seeking (as a dependent variable, it is outside the scope of study)
d) Executive power/strength
Operationalizations; Key Variables
"Foreign Military Assistance," a broad term used by the U.S. Department of
State, 122 shall mean a) conventional arms 123 transfers in exchange for currency, or in lieu

U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 and
2006," Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, http://www.state.goy/t/pm/rls/ipt/fintrpt / 2006/74680.htm
(Accessed June 12, 2008).
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o f debts o w e d to the patron- by the client-state; and b) "military-technical cooperation"
( M T C ) , w h i c h shall include:
•
•
•
•
•

Organization of licensed armament and military equipment production abroad
Maintenance and repairs of armaments and military equipment supplied earlier
Modernization of armaments and military equipment made in Russia
Training of foreign specialists to operate and maintain supplied materiel, either in Russia
or in customer countries
Technical assistance in building military infrastructure installations, such as defense
enterprises, airfields, depots, firing grounds, training centers, etc. 124

F o r t h i s c a s e - s t u d y , " s p e c i a l - i n t e r e s t g r o u p s " s h a l l i n c l u d e : 1) R o s o b o r o n e k s p o r t
(the lone, state-owned and -controlled defense-export c o m p a n y ) , 2) individual

defense

c o m p a n i e s , 3 ) t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e f e n s e ( M O ) a n d all s u b o r d i n a t e d c o m m i s s i o n s , c o m m i t t e e s , a n d s e r v i c e s , 4 ) t h e M i n i s t r y o f F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ( M I D ) , 5) t h e F e d e r a l

Security

Service ( F S B ) , and 6) the Foreign Intelligence Service ( S V R ) . 1 2 5
"Special-interest g r o u p s " can be private- or public-sector institutions.

Private

interest groups, notably defense companies, lobby either to secure a favorable policy
from the state, or a business contract from the state.

G o v e r n m e n t institutions, like the

M O or M I D , can also be considered interest groups w h e n they p u r s u e the special interest,
rather t h a n the national interest.

U n l i k e c o r p o r a t i o n s , w h i c h l o b b y for p o l i c i e s o r c o n -

t r a c t s f o r m o n e t a r y g a i n , s t a t e i n s t i t u t i o n s t y p i c a l l y l o b b y for p o l i c i e s t h a t a l l o w t h e m t o

Note: This study excludes Russian atomic and nuclear energy assistance to Iran as a form of either FMA
or MTC because it assumes that such assistance has been and continues to be legal according to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article IV, Section 2 of the NPT allows Nuclear Weapon States (i.e., Russia) to
trade atomic and nuclear-related materials to, and to cooperate with Non-Nuclear Weapon States (i.e., Iran)
for "the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes'. Thus, this study
assumes that Russian atomic and nuclear energy assistance to Iran is in accordance with the NPT.
124

"Company Info: Basic Trade Activities," Rosoboronexport:
(accessed June 25, 2008).

State Corporation,

http:/'/www.roe.ru/

125
It should be noted that groups three through six are all members of the siloviki, the so-called "power
ministries" that are administered and staffed by current or former KGB agents. Those listed are all
Kremlin-level ministries and services, and thus, are closely connected with President Vladimir Putin,
himself a former KGB agent.
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pursue ideological and/or political agendas. Moreover, as Blank argues, those directing
the defense-export process have other incentives, as they are allowed to extract "rents"
from the process [i.e., bribes, commissions (both legal and illegal), extortion, kickbacks,
and malfeasance]. Far from furthering the national interest, state institutions can just as
easily further their own interests. Thus, they are also considered special-interest groups.
Operationalizations: Control Variables
Regarding the "national interest," Krasner defines it as a state's "drives, compulsions, and aims...that are separate and distinct from the interests of a particular societal
group," and "are associated either with general material objectives or with ambitious
ideological goals related to beliefs about how societies should be ordered." 126
"Non-state actor interest" shall include arms dealers, civilian employees of the
military and the military-industrial complex, and uniformed military personnel who have
illegally acquired arms, munitions, and/or weapons platforms, and have sold them to
other states, or entities within a state. This can also include engineers and technicians
who have sold their services to a state for the development of the state's military-industrial complex, modernization and/or repairs of weapons systems, training, et cetera.
"Rent-seeking," defined by Blank, "means that people who are placed in a
position where they have control over assets are able to appropriate the proceeds or rents
from those assets to their private use without developing the property in question through
a strategy of optimal investments." 127 While this research argues that defense-industry
officials and Kremlin apparatchiks are lobbying for arms sales to Iran in order to extract

Krasner, Defending the National Interest, 10.
Blank, Rosoboroneksport,

7.
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rents from the process, as Tollison (1998) states, it is not concerned with the costs of such
lobbying. 128 It is outside the scope of this study and therefore must be controlled.
Finally, "executive power/strength" will be measured by the state's decisions to
provide arms and military-technical assistance to Iran vis-a-vis foreign (i.e., U.S.) pressure not to provide them amidst escalating security concerns. Conversely, it will also be
measured by the state's ability to restrain arms sales vis-a-vis arms control agreements,
export controls, and foreign (i.e., Iranian) and domestic demand to provide arms.
Measurement
As best as possible, "foreign military assistance" will be measured in terms of: a)
year ordered, b) dollar amount (in U.S. dollars) agreed to by both parties, and, where
applicable, c) year and d) number delivered. The last two measurements are difficult, as
it is often hard to measure results of extensive, ongoing military-technical cooperation,
such as assisting in the development of a state's domestic arms industry, foreign military
financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), and others.
Measuring interest-group pressure on Russia's defense-export policy vis-a-vis
Iran will be done by analyzing English-translation editions of online Russian newspapers,
as well as secondary sources written by Kremlin-watchers and post-Sovietologists. This
research will look for evidence that Russia's defense and defense-export lobbies lobbied
for, or defended arms exports when it was apparent that such exports would not, or did
not advance Russia's national interests. Thus, cognizance of Russia's stated national
interests, executive power to pursue, or uphold the national interest, and governmental
processes will be vital in measuring this data.

Tollison, "The Interest-group theory of Government," 2.
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For example, interest groups are more influential vis-a-vis weak central governments, and little or no export controls or arms control agreements. Thus, active FMA
lobbying under optimal conditions for interest groups, followed by a known FMA agreement with a client-state would be a strong indicator that such lobbying was effective.
However, active FMA lobbying under sub-prime conditions, followed by a known FMA
agreement would be a weaker indicator that such lobbying was effective. Lastly, active
FMA lobbying under sub-prime conditions, followed by no known FMA agreements
would be the weakest indicator that such lobbying was influential.
Limitations
Because Russia's economic, political, and social environments are so nuanced,
accurately and thoroughly conducting a qualitative analysis on this aspect of Russian
foreign policy may be difficult. Likewise, access to accurate, unbiased, and useful information may be difficult, given that neither the principal investigator's native language
nor his academic background is in Russian. Language barriers may hinder this study, but
the principal investigator is confident that such obstacles can be overcome via World
News Connection and through English-language editions of Russian daily newspapers.
Controlling for the "national interest" may make it difficult to determine if and
when special interests drove Russian FMA to Iran or other client-states, and not viceversa. The nature of defense industries, particularly within capitalist economies, makes it
difficult to differentiate between state and societal interests. Pursuance of state interests e.g., arms procurement for its military and allies — inevitably benefits special interests,
like the defense industry. Thus, determining the dominant domestic determinant behind
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Russian defense exports to Iran since President Vladimir Putin took office in 2000 will be
this study's primary challenge.
Furthermore, this study acknowledges that applying the interest-group theory of
government to Stephen J. Blank's analysis of Russia's defense-export process may not
describe and explain Russia's military-technical relationship with Iran as well as other
theories. This study began with the assumption that, despite Putin's pledge to minimize
the role of interest groups in the policy-making process, the defense and defense-export
industries were still dominant and were pursuing their special interests in arming Iran.
Since then, other theories have emerged in the literature, such as corporate, elite, and
rent-seeking theories, which may be as insightful. Thus, interest-group theory may or
may not be an adequate model for describing and explaining this process. Finally, as this
study only works at the domestic level, it does not vet systemic (i.e., international) variables and theories that may round out Russia's military-technical relation-ship with Iran.
For example, Russian arms may have been rewards for Iran's treatment of the Chechen
Wars. Their relationship also makes sense vis-a-vis their mutual fear of U.S. regional
and international hegemony.
Conclusions
Ironically, this study's limitations are what make its contributions to academia
and policy so critical: cutting through the cultural and language barriers between Russia
and the West, and analyzing post-Cold War Russian foreign policies to better understand
its place in the world vis-a-vis the West. Differentiating between "national" and "special
interests" and determining which has been, or is dominant in Russian policy circles will
clarify Russia's place in the post-Cold War, and now the post-9/11 environment.

Is
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Russia an ally in the Global War on Terror whose foreign policies are regrettably
influenced by domestic interest groups? Or, or is it actively and autonomously arming the
West's next potential adversary? If so, then why? The answers to these questions grow in
importance with each day, as both Russia and the U.S. may have to determine where
Russia stands on the Iranian nuclear issue.
Analyzing one of Russia's most dynamic, peculiar, and troubling bilateral
relationships is the work of any good political or military intelligence analyst.

Thus,

identifying not only what foreign military assistance it has provided to Iran, but also why,
is critical for preparing Western democracies to address such policies, and for preparing
its militaries to counter its effects on tomorrow's battlefields.
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CHAPTER III

CASE-STUDY
Post-Cold War Russian Foreign Military Assistance to Iran: 2000-2008
This chapter will begin with a brief overview of Russo-Iranian military-technical
cooperation from November 1989 through December 1999. Understanding the depth and
scope of their pre-2000 bilateral relationship is critical for understanding their post-2000
relationship. Many arms and military-technical agreements signed during Putin's tenure
have concerned repair or upgrade of arms and weapons platforms delivered during the
Gorbachev or Yeltsin years (see Appendix A for a tabled list of all major Russo-Iranian
defense contracts signed since 1989). Also, some arms, like helicopters and anti-tank
guided missiles (ATGMs) were ordered in the 1990s but were delivered after 2000.
This chapter will then describe and analyze Russia's defense exports to Iran since
early 2000. It will chronologically list and detail the arms sales and military-technical
contracts signed between the two countries. It will survey statements made by Kremlin
and industry leaders to analyze the domestic actors who were prominent in the process, as
well as their justifications for conducting such deals. In doing so, it will illuminate the
alternating influence of special-interest groups in the Russo-Iranian military-technical
relationship vis-a-vis the state's attempt to conduct a rational foreign policy. It will also
apply interest-group theory to Stephen J. Blank's argument that under Putin's patrimonial, power-vertical defense-export system, parasitic rent-seekers undermine the state's
efforts to pursue the national interest via defense exports. It will attempt to show active
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rent-seeking and granting in the Russo-Iranian defense-export paradigm.
Finally, this chapter will conclude with a brief summary of the case-study. It will
review the major arms contracts signed between Moscow and Tehran, the justifications
provided, and the domestic actors and forces prevalent in the process. It will also show
Kremlin decision-making vis-a-vis domestic pressure-groups, Iranian pressure to provide
arms, and Washingtonian pressure to halt arms amidst an escalating nuclear crisis.
Background
Late-1989 to Mid-1995: Open Sales
On November 5, 1989, Iran's Speaker of the Parliament, Ali Rafsanjani, flew to
Moscow to discuss arms deals with Soviet officials.129 There, "the first Russo-Iranian
intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed," 130 and
resulted in a total of $5.1 billion in arms sales. 131 The first deal included 24 MiG-29A
Fulcrum multi-role fighters, 12 Su-24MK Fencer fighter-bombers, 132 R-60 and R-27
(NATO reporting names: AA-8 Aphid and AA-10 Alamo) air-to-air missiles, a 10-year
spare-parts agreement, and 2 batteries of the S-200BE (NATO reporting name: SA-5B
Gammon) surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. 133 It also "cement[ed] bilateral ties and
mutual confidence" between Moscow and Tehran. 134

Mali, "The Strategic Partnership of Russia and Iran," 99.
130

Bukkvoll, "Arming the Ayatollahs," 33.
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On May 17, 1990, Russia agreed to sell 3 877EKM Kilo-class diesel-electric
submarines to Iran. A year and a half later, it provided Iran with the domestic production
capacity for more than 1,000 T-72S main battle tanks (MBTs) and 1,500 BMP-2 infantry
fighting vehicles (IFVs). 135

The deal further developed Iran's military-industrial

complex, which would allow it to produce more of its own arms. 136 Also in 1991, Russia
contracted to deliver approximately 15,000 AT-4 Spigot ATGMs, 137 which began in 1993
and continue through today.
Mid-1995 to late-2000: Yeltsin's "No New Contracts" Policy
By 1994, Russia had delivered to Iran all of the MiG-29 and Su-24s fighters, airto-air and surface-to-air missiles, 2 Kilo subs, 80 BMP-2s, 100 T-72s, and about 800 AT4 ATGMs - a sizable arsenal, indeed. But in September, Russian President Boris Yeltsin
stated that arms sales to Iran would end after all current contracts were fulfilled.138 He
cited the Kremlin's "wish to participate in the development of a 'post-COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control]' system". 139

Such an initiative

would also improve relations with the U.S., which would hopefully offset revenue losses.
Then on June 30, 1995, Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and U.S. VicePresident Al Gore signed the secretive and controversial document, dubbed the "GoreChernomyrdin Agreement," by which Russia agreed to forgo signing additional arms

Barabanov, "Russia on Iran's Market for Arms," 2007.
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Ibid. Russia built the T-72 MBT factory, which began production on July 8, 1997 in Dorud, and the
BMP-2 IFV factory, which started work in 1998, in Tehran.
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export contracts with Iran and complete deliveries of arms currently under contract by the
end of 1999. In exchange, the U.S. would help Russian firms find new arms markets, and
use Russian space-launch vehicles (SLVs) to launch commercial satellites into orbit.'
Yeltsin's "no new contracts" initiative in late 1994, followed by the secret GoreCheromyrdin Agreement in mid-1995 subsequently stemmed the flow of Russian arms
and MTC to Iran. However, per the Agreement, Russia delivered its third and final Kiloclass diesel-electric submarine to Iran in 1996,141 complete with "large numbers of wakehoming torpedoes... and advanced naval mines". 142 Thus, between 1996 and 1999, the
financial value of Russian arms sales to Iran totaled just $200 million. 143 However, this
figure hides the illicit technical and technological assistance provided to Iran's missile
programs. From 1994 144 through at least 1998, 145 Russian missile technicians and parts
found their way into Iran, which hastened Iran's Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile
(MRBM) program. Also, Iranian engineers, physicists, and missile technicians received
assistance from Russian universities (see Appendix B for a list of those sanctioned by the
U.S. Government). 146 While the Kremlin admitted that some "individual contacts'
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between Iranian and Russian entities" had occurred, they were not state-sponsored.
However, "reports surfaced in early 1998 that the Russian FSB [Federal Security
Service, Russia's chief domestic intelligence and security agency] was coordinating clandestine missile technology transfers to Iran — allegations denied by Russian officials".
A CIA report was among those that exposed Russia's illicit ballistic missile assistance to
Iran. 149 Despite these allegations, Russian officials claim that it had not violated any of its
export-control and/or non-proliferation agreements - notably, the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR). 150 Though, given that in late-1998, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) successfully test-launched the Shahab-3A MRBM, it is difficult
to imagine that Russian technical assistance had not found its way into Iran's suddenly
successful ballistic missile program.
Late-2000 to Present: Renewed Arms Contracts
In the mid-to-late-1990s, Iran's defense industry began to produce Russian arms
under license. Thus, by January 2000, Iran had procured a total of 422 T-72 MBTs and
413 BMP-2 IFVs, 151 and soon acquired a license to produce Russian tank rounds. That
month, it also began to mass-produce the AT-5 Spandrel ATOM,' 5 2 in addition to hundreds of AT-6s, thousands of AT-4s, and thousands more ATGMs on order. It had also

Rubin, "What are Iran's Domestic Priorities?" 30. For a list of Russian firms suspected of having been
involved with Iran's ballistic missile programs, see Appendix B.
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received more than two dozen Russian Mi-17H and Mi-171Sh multi-role helicopters.
Many of these acquisitions were allowed under the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement.
But SIPRI data suggests that the Mi-171sh helicopters and the AT-5 and -6 ATGMs with
which they could be armed violated the Agreement, as they were ordered after June 30,
1995. 153 Additionally, the successful test-launch of Iran's Shahab-3A MRBM in late1998 strongly suggests that Russian technical and technological assistance found its way
to Iran since before 1995, further undermining Russia's non-proliferation commitments.
Over the next eight years, Russia would not only continue to provide arms and
military-technical assistance to Iran (indeed, defense-exports peaked in 2000 when they
should have receded), it would also renege on the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement
and sign new MTC contracts with Tehran. Figure 3 (below) illustrates this renewed

Figure 3: Russian Arms Exports to Iran: 2000-2007
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Figure 3: Source, "Trend Indicator Value of arms exports from Russia, 1992-2007," Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 31, 2008.

SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, Generated June 11, 2007.
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relationship, again citing SIPRI TIV data.

Though, it is ironic that defense-export

volumes decreased from 2001 on - after Russia indicated it would sign new defense contracts with Iran. But as Figure 2 indicates, the volume spiked in 2006 to $366 million.
Active Lobbying
In March 2000, Vladimir Putin officially became President of Russia.

Putin's

presidency marks the most significant evolutionary period in Russia's defense and
defense-export policies — particularly regarding Iran. 154 Signs of this evolution appeared a
month earlier, when Putin stated that Russia should "engage the enormous scientific-technical and human resources of the [MIC] as much as possible". 155 In April, Boris Kuzyk,
Yeltsin's military-technical cooperation advisor, echoed Putin's statements. He added
that "Russia should explore the arms markets 'more deeply, actively, rationally and consistently,'" 156 with the government lobbying "Russia's interests in the key countries and
regions." 157 Coincidentally, Kuzyk was also "the general director of the New Programs
and Concepts military-industrial holding company, one of the largest Russian companies
of its kind." 158 Though he was speaking on behalf of the Russian MIC's interests, he
might has well have been speaking of his own.
In August 2000, Putin merged Rossiyskiye Tekhnologii into Promexport - both
state-controlled defense-export companies. Then on November 4, Putin merged Prom-
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export and Rosvoorehzenie and created Rosoboronexport, Russia's sole, state-controlled
arms-export company, to increase commercial efficiency and governmental oversight.
Towards these ends, he appointed former Deputy Director of Promexport, Andrei
Belyaninov as Director of Rosoboroneksport. Putin then named former Director General
of Promexport, Sergei Chemezov, as First Deputy Director of Rosoboroneksport.
Coincidentally, both Belyaninov and Chemezov served with Putin in the KGB. 159
A day before Putin consolidated the defense-export sector and created Rosoboroneksport, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov informed U.S. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright that Russia was withdrawing from the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin
Agreement.

He gave two reasons: (1) the secret Agreement was disclosed during the

2000 U.S. Presidential Election; and (2) Iran had made positive domestic political and
social changes, and Russia would reward it, ironically, with renewed arms sales. 160
Three weeks later, Kremlin officials defended withdrawing from the Agreement
and offered a plethora of economic, international, legal, and strategic reasons. Ilya Klebanov, First Deputy Prime Minister, said Russia would soon negotiate the sale of defensive weapons to Iran, which would "not violate Russia's international commitments." 161
He added, "There are quite a lot of limitations on the supply of weapons to such a country
as Iran, relating to both distance and speed." 162 Similarly, Andrei Nikolayev, Chairman
of the State Duma Committee for Defence, insisted that "Russia has always proceeded
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from the observance of international obligations, including the non-proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies." 163 But the Agreement "has no legal force," and "was not
an agreement and not an official document." 164 Thus, Moscow was not bound to it and
could pursue relations with Iran, its "strategic partner in the southerly direction." 165
While Nikolayev believed that renewed Russo-Iranian MTC "will bring political
advantages, above all," 166 he also noted that "Iran is a solvent country, which will be
paying in cash." 167 Similarly, General Anatoly Kvashnin, head of the Russian General
Staff, stated that Russia would expand its MTC "with any countries if it benefits Russia,
benefits its defensive capability, among other things." 168
Though Kremlin officials gave international, legal, and strategic reasons for
renewing Russo-Iranian MTC, their last two statements point the research towards
economic motives. By 2000, Moscow still had between $1.5 and $2.2 billion in arms and
services to deliver to Tehran. Ceasing arms shipments then would have deprived the
MIC of these modest, yet badly needed revenues. 169 Since it continued to sell Iran arms
after the December 31, 1999 deadline, it seems that the Russian defense industry was
already trying to preserve as much revenue as possible from its prior Iranian deals.
Moreover, Tsvang and Wolfson (2001) note that sometime in 2000, Iranian leaders
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decided to undertake a 25-year military-modernization program that would emphasize
Russian arms and technology. 170 Thus, "it was now worthwhile for Moscow to abandon
the limitations placed upon it by the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreements."
Quite obviously, renewed arms contracts with Iran were in the defense industry's
interests. But given Putin's recent consolidation of the defense-export industry to control
policy and revenue, 172 how could the MIC have secured this lucrative policy? It had two
possible - though, not mutually exclusive - inroads through which to lobby Putin. First,
the defense industry campaigned on his behalf before the 2000 presidential election, and
the export sector, in particular (pre-Rosoboroneksport) allegedly "made substantial contributions to Putin's election campaign." 173 Thus, Putin could have repaid his "winning
coalition"

member by forgoing with an unpopular policy and pledging to renew arms

contracts with Iran.
Second, given that the defense industry had representatives close to Putin, it is
very possible that they lobbied for new arms contracts with Iran through this '"classfriendly faction of KGB veterans in Putin's entourage.'" 175 Indeed, both Andrei Belyaninov and Sergei Chemezov had served with Putin in the KGB and were, at the time, both
serving at Rosoboroneksport. Observers at Nezavisimaia Gazeta later cited Boris Kuzyk
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"as the prime mover of the new policy." 176 One should recall that in April, he had stated
that "Russia should explore the arms markets 'more deeply, actively, rationally and consistently,'" 177 with the government lobbying "Russia's interests in the key countries and
regions." 178 Moreover, Boris Kuzyk was the only MIC representative named in Novaia
Gazeta's October 2000 list of trusted governmental and presidential spokesmen. 17

Thus,

it is possible that Kuzyk, a trusted and vested MIC lobbyist, could have lobbied Putin to
annul the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement and renew arms contracts with Iran.
Whether the defense industry called in Putin's debts, or lobbied their interests
through their "class-friendly faction of KGB veterans" in the Kremlin — or both - it is
clear that domestic economic actors lobbied for, and would later receive a favorable Iran
policy. Indeed, Lilia Shevtsova of the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace stated that at the time, "Putin was 'constantly looking over his shoulder at lobby groups." 180 These suspicions were confirmed in early December 2000 when
Andrei Nikolayev told reporters that "the economic benefits and business opportunities
for Russia's defence industry" 181 were the most important reasons for resuming arms
negotiations with Iran. 182 Thus, Moscow planned to sign roughly $7 billion in contracts
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with Tehran "over the next few years." In light of such lucrative prospects, Jane's Intelligence Digest wrote, "the Russians are prepared to risk an inevitable rise in tension with
Washington by ditching a memorandum which never had the status of a ratified, legallybinding treaty." 183 Thus, in addition to international, legal, and strategic variables, the
political economy of the Russian defense industry clearly weighed in Putin's decision to
abrogate the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement and renew arms contracts with Iran.
In early December, Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev flew to Tehran to
discuss future military-technical cooperation with Iran.184 He had hoped that broadening
Russo-Iranian relations would strengthen "security and stability in Central Asia" 185 serving both countries' national interests. 186 It would begin with "supplying spare parts
to the Soviet and Russian military equipment that the Iranian armed forces already possess," followed by conventional arms for defensive purposes. 187 It would also "include
bilateral 'consultations on security...the mutual notification about military doctrines and
military building in our countries,'" 188 and international military education and training
(IMET). 189 The MoD reiterated its claims that Moscow's rapprochement with Tehran
was in both countries' national interests. 190
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In early February 2001, the ultra-nationalist Vice-Chairman of Russia's State
Duma, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, led a parliamentary delegation to Tehran to promote the
new policy out of pure ideological interest.191 Zhirinovsky and other "supporters of an
assertive foreign policy," 192 like former Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov, "count on
closer ties with Iran, India, and China to challenge US influence and promote a multipolar world." Primakov, himself, would later travel with his own delegation to deliver an
identical message. 193 Later that month, Iran's ambassador to Russia, Mehdi Safari, indicated that Iranian President Mohammed Khatami would sign defense contracts with
Russian firms worth between $6.5 and $7 billion. On March 11, Khatami flew to Moscow seeking advanced arms and increased domestic production capacity, 194 including:
Ka-50 Hokum attack helicopters 195
Mi-8/17H Hip multi-role helicopters
Additional MiG-29 Fulcrum multi-role fighter jets
Su-25 Frogfoot CAS fighter-aircraft
Su-27 Flanker air-superiority fighter jets
Additional T-72 MBTs, and the more advanced T-90 MBTs
Advanced naval mines and torpedoes
Licenses to produce Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines 196
Overhaul/upgrade of Iran's three existing Kilos
Production technology for artillery, aviation, and warships
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•
•
•

Self-propelled air defense systems: BUK-M1, S-300P, 7 S-300V, and Tor-Mi
Igla-IE (NATO reporting name: SA-16 Gimlet) MANPADS 198
Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) capability

•

Launchers for its Shahab-3 MRBMs 199
On March 12, President Putin described the arms and services sought by Iran as

purely defensive, adding that "Iran has the right to ensure its country's defensive capacity
and security." 200 However, most of the arms listed above are quite robust, and could very
easily be used in an offensive manner.
Regardless, on March 15, Khatami and Putin issued a joint communique confirming that "mutually advantageous cooperation in the political, economic, scientific and
technical [arenas meet] the national interests of the two countries and plays an important
role in the cause of supporting peace and stability at the regional and global levels.201
The communique also stated that Moscow and Tehran's military-technical cooperation
was "not directed against third countries." 202 Khatami then reportedly signed a total of
$6.7 billion in contracts, with an average of $300 million in arms, hardware, and militarytechnical assistance to be provided annually. 203 Thus, the Russian MIC got what it wanted. As Russian defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer wrote, the "military-industrial lobbies
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are obviously more powerful in the Kremlin today than they were in the 1990s."
On October 5, 2001, Iranian Defence Minister Ali Shamkhani met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Ivanov, in Moscow. Shamkhani sought anti-aircraft, anti-ship,
and anti-tank missiles, as well as Tochka-U (NATO reporting name: SS-21 Scarab) and
Iskander-E (NATO reporting name: SS-26 Stone) tactical/theater ballistic missiles TBM)
— again, hardly defensive weapons. 205 Nevertheless, the two defense ministers signed a
10-year intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation. 20
Disappointment-Corruption
Two months later, the first Iranian defense order placed since the 1995 GoreChernomyrdin Agreement was reached: a paltry $150 million contract for 30 Mi-171sh
multi-role helicopters.

Moreover, Iran apparently acquired just 20 or 21 of the aircraft

from Russia in 2002. 208 In all, the deal fell far short of both Russian military-industrial
and Iranian military-political expectations, suggesting that either Moscow had shown
restraint vis-a-vis U.S. concern or that Iran could not afford more.
Still, there is a third possibility: corruption, mismanagement, and patrimony at
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Rosoboroneksport - the sole, state-controlled arms-exporter that conducted the deal. In
June 2001, reports emerged that President Putin was unhappy with Director Belyaninov
and Deputy Director Chemezov, and that their KGB legacies were hindering company
performance. 209

As Viktor Litovkin states, "representatives of special organizations

[security services] do not always use economic arguments in their work and they sometimes confuse the interests of the state and its enterprises with the interests of particular
groups of state officials."210 While there is nothing wrong with former spies working in
the arms-export industry, they should not lead that industry, as that inevitably leads to
patrimonialism. Under patrimonial business relationships, success often hinges on who
you know rather than what you know - a costly and inefficient business practice. 211
While Litovkin did not connect these legacies and practices to Rosoboroneksport's dealings with Iran, a report published in mid-December of that year suggests that
there had been some mismanagement of company funds, with potential linkage to Iranian
contracts. The State Audit Chamber had exposed "violations in the arms trade, including
small deductions to the federal budget," 212 which Putin's Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation (CMTC) could not explain.

These "small" deductions amounted to

$70 million, suggesting corruption, malfeasance, and mismanagement at Rosoboroneksport,213 right around the time of the Mi-171 deal.
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Russo-Iranian Military-Technical Developments
In addition to the apparently botched helicopter deal, several reputable sources
claim that sometime in 2001, Iran procured two batteries of the S-300 PMU (NATO
reporting name: SA-10C Grumble C) self-propelled air defense system from Russia,
complete with 96 4V55RUD long-range, low-to-high altitude SAMs. 214 The systems
reportedly became operational in February 2003 and are positioned in and around
Tehran, 215 but neither their status nor origin can be confirmed. Also, sources have "confirmed" to Jane's Defence Weekly that, as of May 2007, Iran had acquired at least two of
the newer, more advanced versions of the system, either the S-300 PMU-1 or PMU-2. 216
However, like the older variants, neither their status nor their origins can be confirmed.
Meanwhile, Russian officials have consistently denied exporting them to Iran.
The years 2002 through 2004 were fairly unremarkable for the Russo-Iranian
arms trade. In 2002, Russia shipped 20 or 21 of the 30 Mi-171sh military transport helicopters that Tehran originally ordered. In 2003, Russia delivered the first three of six Su25T Frogfoot close air-support (CAS) fighter-aircraft to Iran, which complemented the
seven ex-Iraqi Air Force Su-25s that were flown to Iran during the 1991 Persian Gulf
War.

In September 2003, the U.S. government sanctioned Russia's Tula Instrument
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Design Bureau "for selling laser-guided artillery shells to Iran." 217 The move was more
likely a diplomatic warning shot than a punitive measure, as the U.S. government and
military did not contract with Tula. But in 2004 and again in 2005, Russo-Iranian MTC
hit its lowest levels, plunging below 1995 levels to just $14 million in annual volume.
In July 2005, Rosoboroneksport contracted with Iranian officials to repair and
upgrade its 3 Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines. Each would be serviced for $80 or
$90 million, to include the fitting of Russia's newest anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM), the
3M-54 Klub-S (NATO reporting name: SS-N-27 Sizzler). 218 By year's end, at least one
Kilo had been serviced, but it was unknown if the ASCMs were, or would be installed.219
Taking Sides?
In August 2005, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom (the EU-3) presented
Iran's newly-elected president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with an incentives-based proposal to halt its nuclear program. After the EU-3's proposal was "contemptuously rejected
as a joke, and Iran announced the resumption of work at the uranium enrichment conversion plant at Isfahan," 220 the issue was referred to the IAEA. Thus, in late September, the
IAEA met to discuss Iran's nuclear program and how to address it. Russia opposed referring the matter to the UN Security Council. 221 "But, after a heated debate, Russia (along
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with eleven other countries) abstained from an IAEA resolution, passed 22 to 1 5 " 222 that
ultimately referred Iran's nuclear program to the Security Council. 223 Robert Freedman
(2006) notes that
Russia's behavior at the IAEA meeting illustrated Moscow's ongoing dilemma in dealing with Iran. While [it] did not want Iran to acquire nuclear
weapons, it also did not want sanctions imposed on one of its closest allies,
who was also a good customer, buying not only the Bushehr nuclear reactor (and possibly more in the future) but military equipment, as well. 224
Despite Russia's abstention, a second IAEA meeting was scheduled for late
November.

Meanwhile, Tehran escalated the crisis by reprocessing more uranium at

Isfahan. Then, the Iranian parliament voted "to stop IAEA inspection of its facilities if
the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council." 225 At the IAEA meeting, "Moscow
continued to oppose referring Iran to the UN Security Council," 226 though it
acknowledged "that it could happen." 227 Russian delegates also compromised with the
EU-3 to allow Iran to convert enriched uranium into uranium hexafluoride gas: the
enrichment would happen in Russia, but the conversion would happen in Iran. 228 This
would ensure that Iran would not enrich uranium to weapons grade, but preserve its right
to civilian nuclear energy. But Iranian delegates rejected the EU-3-Russia compromise
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and demanded "the right to develop a full fuel cycle."
Soon after the IAEA meeting, reports emerged that Russian and Iranian officials
had signed a $1.4 billion arms contract - their largest since the early-1990s. Rosoboroneksport would modernize Iran's Soviet-era MiG-29 and Su-24 fighters, and sell it 29 TorM i (NATO reporting name: SA-15 Gauntlet) mobile, short-range air defense (SHORAD)
systems,

with which Iran would defend its nuclear infrastructure.

Indeed, the head

of Russia's Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSVTS; formerly the
CMTC), Mikhail Dmytriyev, stated that their "mission is to protect a specific facility"232
(i.e., the Busheher reactor complex). Likewise, Defense Minister and First Deputy Prime
Minister, Sergei Ivanov, stated that the systems were "designed for the defence of that
country." 233 Furthermore, Putin stated "We have done this so that Iran should not feel
cornered or [sic] that is in some hostile surrounding and understand that he has a channel
for communication and friends who can be trusted." 234
The timing of the deal, coupled with the above statements, suggest a calculated,
state-autonomous attempt by the Kremlin to balance Russia's domestic-economic and
regional security interests vis-a-vis foreign pressure - both to sell and not to sell arms to
Iran. Russia's defense industry had wanted to renew, and then expand its sales to Iran,
while Tehran had wanted fighter-upgrades and air-defense systems (among many other

Barabanov, "Russia on Iran's Market for Arms," 2007.
1

SlPRl Arms Transfer Database, Generated June 11, 2007.

2

"Russian Official Cites 'No Doubts' in Sale of Air Defense Launchers to Iran," 2007.

3

"Russia Does Not Break Rules in Arms Trade with Iran - Defence Minister," 2007.

4

"Russian Arms Sales to Iran Minimal - Putin," 2007.

63

items) from Moscow since at least Khatami's March 2001 visit. Thus, it appears that for
nearly five years, Moscow had restrained both domestic and foreign pressure to provide
such arms until it was deemed appropriate — useful, even — for it to do so. After the
November IAEA meeting, it was clear that Iran's nuclear program would progress, and
the matter would be referred to the UN Security Council. There, Russia would have to
either agree to sanction Iran, or obstruct the diplomatic process, which experience has
shown to lead to preventative military action. Either way, Russia's economic and regional interests were at stake. By providing Iran with short-range, low-to-medium altitude air
defense systems, Moscow satisfied its defense-industrial lobby, helped Tehran deter
military action, and preserved the regional military balance in the process.
Thus, in 2006, Russia began upgrading Iran's MiG and Sukhoi fighters, and
would deliver the first Tor-Mi SHORAD systems in December. 235 Meanwhile, Russia
delivered three Su-25UBK combat-trainer aircraft and 40 R-60 (AA-8 Aphid) short-range
air-to-air missiles to Iran's Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC). It also sold the
VA-111 Shkval rocket-propelled, super-cavitating torpedo to the Iranian Navy, and tested
it during summer naval exercises in the Persian Gulf. In response, the U.S. Department
of State sanctioned Rosoboroneksport and Sukhoi on July 28, 2006, citing their violations
of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. 236 It sanctioned Rosoboroneksport again on
December 28, as well as the Kolomna and Tula Design Bureaus, this time citing the Iran
and Syria Nonproliferation Act. 237
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The Russian Foreign Ministry rejected the sanctions as "an application of domestic legislature to international matters." 238 Despite the sanctions, both the value and volume of Russo-Iranian military-technical cooperation spiked in 2006, as by then, Iran had
also procured hundreds more BMP-2 IFVs and T-72 MBTs, and thousands more ATGMs
from Russia. Indeed, Mikhail Dmitriyev, director of Russia's FSVTS, confirmed that the
sanctions had no effect Russia's MTC with foreign states. "However," he added, "that
was a very important message for us."

39

A Conflict of Interests?
In January 2007, Pavel Felgenhauer of the conservative Jamestown Foundation
noted that Viktor Ivanov, an advisor and colleague of Putin from their KGB years, is the
chairman of the board of directors of Almaz-Antei. 240

In fact, Putin, who had been

recruited to the KGB by Ivanov in the 1970s, appointed Ivanov and other former KGB
officers to Almaz-Antei in 2002 "to control the billions of dollars of proceeds generated
by anti-aircraft missile exports." 41 Coincidentally, the state-owned air-defense consortium manufactured the Tor-Mis that were sold to Iran. Thus, as Felgenhauer notes, "this
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made the Iranian Tor-Mi contract a very special order for Kremlin insiders."
Indeed, the contract typifies the patrimonialism and conflicted interests that are
inherent in Russia's military-industrial and military-technical affairs. Andrei Belyaninov,
Sergei Chemezov, Sergei Ivanov, Viktor Ivanov, and Mikhail Dmitriyev all served with
Putin in the KGB or FSB, either in East Germany or St. Petersburg. Coincidentally - or
perhaps consequently — they have all had personal and professional interests in Russia's
defense and defense-export industry (see Table 1, below). Sergei Chemezov holds stock
in both Rosoboroneksport and Rostekhnologii (Rosoboroneksport's state-owned holdingcompany), and is CEO of the latter.

Moreover, Sergei Ivanov, who now directs the

Military-Industrial Commission and its subordinate, the Federal Service for MilitaryTechnical Cooperation (FSVTS), became chairman of the board of directors at the United
Aircraft Corporation (OAK) in December 2006. 243 Since OAK owns MiG, Sukhoi, and
other military aircraft companies, Ivanov would personally benefit from aircraft sales,
repairs, and modernization contracts with Iran. These conflicted interests further blur the
line between pursuing their business interests and Russia's national interests.
Table 1: Former KGB Agents in the Defense- and Defense-Export Industry
Individual
Business Interest
Andrei Belyaninov Rosoboroneksport
Sergei Chemezov
Rosoboroneksport/Russian Technology
Sergei Ivanov
OAK (United Aircraft Corporation: Ilyushin, MiG, Sukhoi, and
Tupolev), Rosnanotech, Rosoboroneksport
Viktor Ivanov
Aeroflot (Civilian Aircraft Company), Almaz-Antei
Table 1: Brian D. Taylor, Russia's Power Ministries: Coercion and Commerce (Syracuse: Maxwell, 2007),
49. All additions mine.
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Prospective Deals
Throughout 2007, British, Israeli, and Iranian media reported that Russian-Iranian
military-technical cooperation would increase — qualitatively and quantitatively - with
the sale of newer and more advanced conventional arms. Moreover, the reports came
after the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1747, which barred states from directly
or indirectly providing arms, military-technical, and/or nuclear assistance to Iran. Thus,
news that Moscow was ratcheting up its defense-exports to Iran on the heals of prior
exports suggested that Russia, which had voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1747, was
again merely paying lip-service to international security while undermining it.
On May 22, 2007, Jane's Defence News reported that Iran would receive at least
10 Pantsyr-SIE (NATO reporting name: SA-22 Greyhound) advanced SHORAD systems
from Russia via Syria, which had just contracted with Rosoboroneksport for 50 such
systems.

Citing a source close to the deal, Robin Hughes wrote, "Iran will [sic] part

finance the Syrian acquisition along with payment for its own 10 systems to Damascus
for its compliance with the deal." 245 Furthermore, the systems Iran would receive would
"not be taken from the first ones supplied to Syria but from later deliveries," 246 and would
thus arrive in late-2008. 247

The indirect route of the systems would allow Russian

officials to categorically deny that they had sold them to Iran. However, since UNSC
Resolution 1747 forbids arms cascading, Russia would still be in violation.
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On July 30, 2007, The Jerusalem Post published a sensationalist report indicating
that Iran may purchase 250 Su-30MKI Flanker multi-role fighter aircraft and 20 IL-76
airborne tankers with which to extend their range. 248 If true, the deal would make the
Iranian Air Force the preeminent air force in the Middle East and alter the military
balance decidedly in Iran's favor. However, Russian officials have flatly denied the deal
and as of June 30, 2008, nothing has come of it.
As fears of a preventative U.S. or Israeli air strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure
mounted, voices within Russia's State Duma lobbied for more, and more advanced arms
sales to Iran. On September 5, the ultra-nationalist Vice-Chairman of the State Duma,
Vladimir Zhirinovsky called for the rapid delivery of Russia's newest, most advanced air
defense system, the S-400 Triumf (NATO reporting name: SA-21 Growler) to Iran.
Given the imminence of an air strike on Iran's infrastructure, Zhirinovksy called for the
air-defense systems to "be delivered as soon as possible to enable Iran to defend its
airspace." 249 The Triumf had just been successfully tested that summer, but despite Mr.
Zhirinovsky's urging, defense-industry sources had already stated that the S-400 would
not be exported to any country - even those in the CIS - in the next few years. 250
Regardless, tensions eased on December 2 when the U.S. National Intelligence
Council (NIC) published its National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), "Iran: Nuclear Inten-
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tions and Capabilities." According to the NIE, the U.S. intelligence community assessed
"with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program." 251
However, it also assessed "with moderate-to-high confidence" 252 that, at a minimum,
Tehran is "keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons." 253
Encouraged by the NIE, Russian and Iranian officials met later that month at their
fourth intergovernmental commission for military-technical cooperation in Tehran. 254
There, they negotiated the sale of additional air defense systems, Ka-32 helicopters, and
modified RD-33 aircraft engines to upgrade Iran's aging fleet of F-5 fighters, as well as
all domestically produced variants of the U.S.-made aircraft. Speaking of the arms deal,
Mikhail Dmitriev, head of Russia's FSVTS, stated that "Russia and Iran are
strengthening stability in the region." 255 He also stressed that the arms in question were
defensive, and that "Iran has never asked for and Russia would never give Iran offensive
weapons to encourage, conditionally speaking, aggression against anyone." 256
But on December 27, Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammed-Najjar stated
that Russia would sell Iran five batteries of the S-300PMU-1 mobile air-defense system
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for $800 million. 257 If true, Tehran would significantly enhance its air-defense capability,
which would shield its nuclear infrastructure from air and missile strikes, and thus allow
it to progress with an offensive nuclear weapons program.

The next day, Russia's

FSVTS denied negotiating the deal, 258 while Rosoboroneksport and Almaz-Antei had no
comment. But neither denied the deal, 259 suggesting that Tehran and Moscow are playing
a game of calculated ambiguity in order to test the waters in Washington and Jerusalem. 260 "If followed through," Pavel Baev writes, "these developments could signify not
only a 'softening' of Russia's position on the long-unfolding Iran crisis, but a complete
collapse of the international efforts aimed at dismantling Iran's nuclear program." 261
Summary
This chapter examined Russia's post-Cold War military-technical relationship
with Iran from 2000 to present day - basically, since Vladimir Putin took office.

In the

months that preceded his decision to renounce the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement,
defense-industry lobbyists and Iranian officials had expressed interest in resuming arms
sales to Iran and others. When Putin consolidated the defense-export industry and placed
two former KGB colleagues in executive-level positions, the military-industrial complex
had inroads to Putin's policy-making process. And when Iranian officials announced that
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they would begin a 25-year military-modernization plan that would feature mostly
Russian weapons, systems, and tactics, Putin appears to have caved into interest-group
pressure at home. Statements made by Kremlin officials cite legal, inter-national, and
social reasons for resuming arms negotiations with Iran.

But the most and most

consistent statements concerned the obvious economic incentives for Russia's MIC.
In December 2001, the first Russo-Iranian arms contract since the early 1990s
was signed. However, it fell far short of Russian military-industrial and Iranian militarypolitico expectations.

Indeed, just one item on Khatami's "shopping list" had been

delivered to Iran. Russian restraint, or perhaps Iranian financial woes may explain why
only 20 or 21 helicopters were sold the following year. Available data does not indicate
one or the other. However, in June 2001 and again in December 2001, reports emerged
that the Kremlin was dissatisfied

with Rosoboroneksport's

performance,

citing

accounting problems, corruption, malfeasance, and mismanagement. While the reports
indicate that rent-seeking had taken place at Rosoboroneksport at the time of the Iranian
Mi-171 deal, there is no conclusive or direct evidence to link rent-seeking with that deal.
From 2002 through mid-2005, Russo-Iranian military-technical cooperation
cooled. The hype surrounding their new cooperation is said to have given way to Iranian
financial woes, and Russian reluctance to provide Iran with newer, more advanced
systems given their nuclear activities.

However, there is no data available to draw

conclusions on why Russo-Iranian MTC subsided during these years. In the summer of
2005, Russia agreed to repair and upgrade Iran's three aging Kilo-class diesel-electric
submarines, supposedly with the new Klub-S ASCM. However, it is not known if they
have received the system.
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In December 2005, following heated IAEA meetings concerning Iran's nuclear
program, Russia announced plans to sell Iran 29 Tor-Mi mobile SHORAD systems to
defend its nuclear infrastructure. Given that the Tor-Mis had been on Khatami's list for
nearly five years, the deal's timing and purpose suggest that the Kremlin had greater control of the defense industry and thus resisted their special-interest pressures to provide
these and other, more capable systems. Indeed, "executive strength" factored into the
Russo-Iranian MTC paradigm as an intervening variable, particularly in Putin's second
term. Thus, in 2005 and 2006, he apparently used arms exports to Iran to further several
of Russia's national interests, which included patronizing its defense industry, protecting
its other investments in Iran (i.e., the Bushehr reactor complex), and strengthening
security and stability in the Middle East.
Despite Putin's apparent furthering of Russia's national interests via arms exports
to Iran, the Tor-Mi deal involved an incestuous, patrimonial system in which former
KGB colleagues are placed in high positions within the MIC and are allowed to seek
rents from the process. Viktor Ivanov benefited personally from the Tor-Mi deal, since
his company manufactured the systems.

However, he had been at Almaz-Antei for

nearly four years before the deal was approved, suggesting that Russia's national interests
were of primary concern, while Ivanov's business interests were secondary. Thus, this
study was unable to connect rent-seeking behaviors to Russo-Iranian arms contracts, even
when MIC actors were pre-positioned, there were incentives, and there had been
precedence to seek rents.

72

CONCLUSIONS

Summary of Findings
Interest-Group Theory and Arms Exports to Iran
This study found that the interest-group theory of government is partially applicable to Russia's military-technical cooperation with Iran since 2000. The data presented
shows that interest groups lobbied successfully to repeal the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement in November 2000. There were international variables, such as the deal becoming
public record in the U.S. and Iran's supposedly positive steps at home. However, the
most prominent factor seemed to be the Russian defense industry interests and lobbying.
This lobbying came in the form of both intra-governmental (i.e., bureaucratic) and extragovernmental (i.e., economic and industrial) lobbying from the beginning of Putin's
administration. They eventually won a modest renewal of military-technical cooperation
with Iran. Thus, the hypothesis: (HI) If interest groups lobby for arms sales, then arms
sales will increase, is strongly supported by this part of the case-study.
However, beginning in 2002 and continuing through at least the beginning of
2005, defense-industry interests and lobbying were much less successful in winning arms
contracts with Iran, as the value and volume of their exports declined sharply to just $14
million in 2004 and again in 2005. By then, it appears that Putin had sufficiently consolidated the defense-export industry, and thus, had sufficient executive power to control the
MIC vis-a-vis Iranian demand for advanced, major conventional arms. By then, the Iranian nuclear crisis was escalating, and though Iran would become Russia's third best
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customer, it was not in Russia's interests to sell to Iran at the time. Thus, hypothesis:
(HI) If interest groups lobby for arms sales, then arms sales will increase, is not
supported by this part of the case-study.
In late 2005, Putin appeared to turn the tables on the defense-industry, using the
sale of 29 Tor-Mi mobile SHORAD systems to Iran to further several Russian national
interests. Certainly, strengthening the defense industry was one of them. But statements
made by Russian and Iranian officials indicate that international variables were also at
play: strengthening stability and security in the Middle East by protecting Iran's territory
and infrastructure - i.e., deterring EU-3, Israeli, and/or U.S. military action.

Further-

more, such a policy initiative reflects Russian executive power and state-autonomy vis-avis decision-making.

Iran had sought the Tor-Mi SHORAD systems for nearly five

years, and the defense industry had sought to provide them and other, more advanced,
capable, and costly systems. But Putin resisted both foreign and domestic pressure, and
approved the deal only when it furthered Russian national interests, and without upsetting
regional and international military balances. Thus, the hypothesis (HI) If interest groups
lobby for arms sales, then arms sales will increase, is not supported by this part of the
case-study. Interest-group lobbying did not appear to have a bearing on Putin's decisionmaking; executive decision-making vis-a-vis international developments did.
Thus, from 2007 on, interest-group theory proved either inapplicable or
inconclusive. Nothing has come of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's call to ship the S-400 Triumf
to Iran in September, and statements made by MIC officials indicate that neither Iran nor
any other foreign country will acquire the advanced air-defense system any time soon.
Meanwhile, it remains to be seen what - if anything — will come of the Su-30MKI, S-300
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PMU-1, and Pantsyr-SIE deals.
It is worth pointing out that beginning in 2005 and continuing through today,
Putin consolidated his grip on other sectors of the Russian economy - notably, the energy
and financial industries, and the media.

By then, Yukos, once Russia's largest oil

company, had been shut down and its CEO, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, imprisoned. Other
so-called "oligarchs," like Boris Berezovsky (CEO of Sibneft, another oil company) and
Vladimir Gusinsky, CEO of MediaMost, have since fled to London fearing a similar fate.
Thus, Putin has pressured political enemies to move from the private industry and insert
loyal friends and colleagues in their place in a de facto re-nationalization of industry.
This has ensured that special-interest groups serve the state (or, at the very least, Putin
and the Kremlin) before they serve themselves. Indeed, state-ownership and/or control of
the media has gone a long way to serve these ends.
Rent-Seeking and Arms Exports to Iran
While interest-group theory was partially-applicable to the case-study, it was not
able to reveal rampant rent-seeking by Kremlin and defense-industrial officials in the
context of the Russo-Iranian relationship. It revealed a couple of instances in mid- and
late-2001 when corruption, malfeasance, and mismanagement were undermining Rosoboroneksport's performance in the defense-export industry. While this supports Stephen
J. Blank's general argument concerning the defense-export monopoly, there was no available data to connect these business practices with Russia's defense contracts with Iran.
Likewise, the Russo-Iranian deal for 29 Tor-Mi mobile SHORADs in December
2005 suggests, but does not link, rent-seeking with Russia's military-technical relations
with Iran. Though Viktor Ivanov had close personal and professional connections with
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Putin, who had appointed him to Almaz-Antei in 2002, it does not appear that Ivanov
used them to lobby him or his subordinates for the deal. Or if he had, he was not successful, as the Tor-Mis were on Iran's wish-list for nearly five years before Putin allowed
them to be exported. Thus, Ivanov was in a position to benefit from his company's sale
of the air-defense systems, but was only able to when Putin approved the sale. Thus, the
hypothesis (H2): If interest groups seek rents from arms sales, then arms sales will
increase, is not supported by this part of the case-study.
Recommendations for Future Studies
In light of this case-study's findings, future studies could measure Russo-Iranian
military-technical cooperation several different ways. Working at the domestic level,
future studies could apply any one of several theories to the same case-study, such as
corporate, elite, and rent-seeking theories. The nature of Russia's defense- and defenseexport industries is such that they are entirely state-owned and controlled, resembling not
independent entities under a capitalist system, but de facto government bureaus staffed
with loyal government apparatchiks.

Thus, future studies could apply corporate, or

corporatist theory to this case-study to determine if it more accurately and consistently
describes, explains, and perhaps predicts Russian foreign military assistance to Iran.
Also, since those in charge of the defense-export process appear to mostly originate from the KGB or one of its post-Cold War successors (e.g., the FSB, SVR), Russia's
post-Cold War defense-export system appears to be militocratic, or elitist. Thus, future
studies could apply elite theory, or a similar theory to determine if who you are, where
you came from, and if you served the state have any bearing on Russia's defense-exports,
particularly to problematic regimes-states like Iran. Perhaps those with security service
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back-grounds who grew up with an anti-American, anti-Western Weltanschauung, and
view arms sales to their enemies as a way to undermine their interests are more likely to
continue to fight yester-year's wars with yester-year's tactics.
Moreover, future studies could apply the rent-seeking theory, itself, to RussianIranian military-technical cooperation. Recall that this study applied the interest-group
theory to Blank's analysis of the Russian defense industry hoping to illuminate interestgroup lobbying as well as rent-seeking within Russia's defense-exports to Iran. But it
was only able to uncover the former, and only in the beginning of Moscow and Tehran's
renewed relationship.

Thus, future studies could seek to uncover the effects of that

lobbying (i.e., the parasitic rent-seeking and granting). This would perhaps be the hardest
theory to apply to the case-study, for two reasons.
First, since rent-seeking theory measures the effects of lobbying, it would almost
certainly have to move from a political to a financial analysis.

It would have to analyze

myriad variables, including whether companies were selling at discount, market, or premium prices; their yearly profits; percentage of profits sent to state coffers, legally or
illegally held as profits, reinvested in the company, used to buy up other companies, or
spent on over-head. It would also have to investigate claims of bribes, kickbacks, extortion, and myriad other unscrupulous business activities that go on behind closed doors.
Also, the nature of defense industries in capitalist economies makes it difficult to
discern between companies and governments exporting arms to further their national or
special interests — be they bureaucratic, economic, ideological, tactical, and so on.
Accusations of rent-seeking and -granting are not just applicable to the Russo-Iranian
case-study. Who in Venezuela needs 24 Su-30MKI fighter-bombers? Will 24 new F-16
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C/Ds really help Pakistan fight the GWOT? Why does South Korea buy arms from
Russia and the U.S.? Arms purchases can be justified in more ways than they can be
used; and not just abroad.

Corruption and rent-seeking have also rocked the U.S.

government in recent years, with Congressman Randy "Duke" Cunningham convicted of
taking bribes and gifts from defense contractors in exchange for Pentagon contracts.
Beyond the domestic level, future studies could also look at the Russo-Iranian
military-technical relationship at the international level. Indeed, Russian policy-makers
consistently defined Russia's overall policy vis-a-vis Iran in terms of geopolitical interest
- security, stability, commerce, energy, and mutual protection from outside forces (i.e.,
NATO, Turkey, and the U.S.). While this study granted these factors, it did not examine
them closely. Thus, future studies could look at the Iranian nuclear crisis, NATO expansion, insurgencies in the Caucuses and Central Asia, and even the GWOT as potential
drivers of Russo-Iranian military-technical cooperation.
Recommendations for U.S. Policy Makers
Unfortunately, the U.S. government has limited countermeasures when addressing
Russian foreign military assistance to Iran. Moscow has already violated and withdrawn
from a key bilateral arms control agreement with the U.S. - the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin
Agreement - which critics say never had the status of a legally-binding international
treaty anyway. Meanwhile, multilateral arms control agreements already exist, such as
the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the various
UN Security Council Resolutions which prohibit arms trading with Iran.

However,

experience has shown that Moscow circumvents or flouts nonproliferation measures
while it pays lip-service to international security and stability.

Experience has also
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shown that Moscow pays little-to-no regard to U.S. legislation prohibiting arms deals
with Iran, and has taken steps to ensure that its companies' commercial dealings with
U.S. companies are not affected by U.S. government-imposed sanctions.
Nonetheless, the U.S. government should follow a four-dimensional approach to
counter Russia's military-technical cooperation with Iran. 262 First, it should continue to
point to Russia's commitments to nonproliferation and international security, particularly
as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. When its actions appear to diverge
from its commitments, U.S. officials should resort to "the politics of shame" and call
Moscow out on its actions. Second, it should then sanction Russian firms, citizens, and
institutes suspected of selling, loaning, leasing, or otherwise providing any form of military assistance to Iran. Perhaps the reason why President Putin has exercised relative
restraint in Russia's military-technical cooperation with Iran is the notion that he and his
administration will inevitably be criticized and his colleague's companies sanctioned by
Washington, even if the U.S. is the world's number one arms dealer.
Third, U.S. officials and policy-makers should attempt to find common ground
with Russia on the Iranian nuclear issue, beyond the IAEA and UN Security Council.
Washington should understand that Moscow does not want to see Iran acquire nuclear
weapons either; but it does not share Western concern vis-a-vis Iran's nuclear activities.
Russia has a complex, interdependent relationship with Iran: they are diplomatic, economic, political and strategic partners with shared security concerns. Thus, it does not
262

Note: This study only examines the supply-side of the Russo-Iranian military technical relationship. It
grants that Iran acts rationally in its pursuit of advanced, major conventional arms and military assistance,
particularly as members of the European Union, Israel, and central actors within the incumbent U.S. presidential administration lobby for military action on Iran's civil, military, and nuclear infrastructure. Since
the U.S. currently does not have diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, its only diplomatic
course of action is to address the supply-side of the problem - i.e., engaging the political actors within the
Russian government (as well as Belarus, China, the DPRK, Poland, Ukraine, et al).
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make sense for Iran to bite the hand that feeds it, builds its nuclear reactors, and equips its
military. Perhaps the only reason why Russia does not want to see Iran develop a nuclear
weapon is that it fears an Israeli or U.S. military response. 263 Even a brief conflict in Iran
would be too close for Russia's comfort, which is already threatened by eastern NATO
expansion, a proposed missile defense shield in Poland the Czech Republic, and conflicts
in the Caucuses and Central Asia. Indeed, given the West's hubris and saber-rattling, and
Jerusalem and Washington's precedence for launching preventative military action on
suspected WMD states, Moscow's fears are real.
Thus, the U.S. should assure Russia that it, along with the EU-3 and the UN are
committed to resolving the issue peacefully and diplomatically. It should also inform
Israel of this renewed and strengthened diplomatic course, and assure it that while the
U.S. is committed to peacefully resolving the nuclear crisis, it will not tolerate unilateral
military action by either Iran or Israel. U.S. officials could threaten to withhold Peace
Marble military aid packages to Israel if Jerusalem were to defect, hunt the hare, and
sabotage the diplomatic process. Collectively, such measures should assuage Moscow's
need to protect its investments in Iran, as well as prevent a third war from breaking out in
its proverbial back yard.
Finally, the U.S. military should quietly prepare to exercise the military option.
By most accounts, the military option is a nearly no-win scenario, as it is debatable
whether any air-strike could neutralize the Iranian nuclear program.

Iranian leaders

learned from the 1991 Persian Gulf War and built many of their nuclear facilities underground and/or hardened them with layered steel and reinforced concrete. With precision-

Eugene B. Rumer, Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin (London: Routledge, 2007), 38.
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guided, blinker-busting bombs dropped from high altitudes, many of Iran's facilities
would be severely damaged or destroyed; but they could always be rebuilt. Moreover,
the engineers and technicians who harbor the most vital components of all — the expertise
- could be relocated at a moment's notice and would live to build another day.
Meanwhile, the action would cause Iran's moderate, pro-Western citizens and
leaders to radicalize, rally around the mullahs, and ultimately undo decades of progress
made by internal and external leaders to improve relations with the West. Furthermore,
given Iran's vows to retaliate with "the oil weapon," the West might then be cut off from
25-40% of the world's oil, sending its economies further into recession and its governments into panic mode. Also, Israeli cities and/or U.S. forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the
Middle East would likely be targeted with Iran's ballistic missiles, while U.S. cities and
global assets would also be targeted by asymmetrical means. Lastly, Israel and/or the
U.S. would draw the ire of the world, further chastening their diplomatic maneuvering.
The military option would be a nightmare scenario, whether the U.S. or Israel
exercised it. Thus, it should be the U.S. government's last resort. However, should diplomatic efforts fail, the above scenario would still be better than Washington or Jerusalem
dissolving beneath a fiery mushroom cloud, with hundreds of thousands or millions dead.
So while the IAEA, UN, and the U.S. State Department work to diplomatically resolve
the crisis, the U.S. military should still prepare for the military option.
In preparation for an air campaign and in an attempt to counter years of Russian
help in rebuilding Iran's air defenses, the U.S. Air Force and Navy should acquire Soviet/
Russian air-defense systems through FSU Republics and allies with such systems. They
should adjust their electronic countermeasures (ECM) and prepare for the suppression of
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enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission in order to facilitate safe ingress to targets. Also, in
order to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, the U.S. Navy should prepare to hunt, track, and
kill Iran's 3 Kilo-class diesel-electric attack submarines, and interdict mine-layers and/or
missile patrol boats. To counter the ballistic missile threat, U.S. forces should position
Patriot PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile batteries in Kuwait, Iraq, and Israel (if they have not
already been placed there). Furthermore, it should position at least one of its sea-based
missile-defense plat-forms inside the Persian Gulf in order to "layer" its missile defenses
and increase the chances of successfully intercepting incoming missiles.
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Appendix A: Major Russian Conventional Arms Transfers to Iran: 1989-2007
Date Name of Weapon/Classification

Quantity

1989

24

Delivery completed in 1994

12
2 batteries
(12
launchers)
3

Delivery completed in 1994
Delivery completed in 1994; unknown
number of 5N62 missiles transferred;
domestic production underway
Delivery completed in 1996

1,000

Local production began in 1993; 826
procured as of 2006
Local production began in 1993; 800
procured as of 2006
Delivery began in 1993; 9,750 delivered
as of 2006
For Russian T-54/5, and Chinese Type
59 MBTs; Delivery completed in 2000
To arm MiG-29s

1989
1989
1990
1991
1991

MiG-29A Fulcrum multi-role fighter
aircraft
Su-24MK Fencer fighter-bomber
S-200BE (SA-5 Gammon) fixed air
defense system
877EKM/A7/o-class diesel electric
submarine
T-72S Main Battle Tank (MBT)

1,500

1991

BMP-2 armed infantry fighting vehicle
(IFV)
9MIII (AT-4 Spigot) ATGM

1993

V-46 Diesel Engine (AV)

200

1994

94

1995

AA-8 Aphid and AA-10 Alamo air-to-air
missiles (AAM)
9M14M (AT-3 Sagger) ATGM

Unknown

1997
1998

D-30 122 MM towed artillery gun
Mi-8/17 Hip-H multi-role helicopter

100
5

1998

9M113 (AT-5 Spandrel) ATGM

Unknown

1999
1999

9M114 (AT-6 Spiral) ATGM
Mi-171Sh Hip Multi-role helicopter

540
22

2001
2003

Mi-171Sh Hip Multi-role helicopter
Su-25 close air-support (CAS) fighterground attack (FGA) aircraft
Kilo submarine upgrades; possibly with
Klub-S (SS-N-27 Sizzler) ASCM
MiG-29 and Su-24 upgrades
Tor-Mi (SA-15 Gauntlet) mobile, shortrange air defense system
9K331 (SA-15 Gauntlet) low-to-medium
altitude surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
R-60 (AA-8 Aphid) short-range air-to-air
missile (SRAAM)s
Modified RD-33 aircraft engines

20-30
6

2005
2005
2005
2005
2006
2007

15,000

3
Unknown
29
500
40
Unknown

Notes/Status

Delivery began in 1996; 2750 delivered
as of 2006
Delivered between 1998 and 2002
For Search and Rescue (SAR); Delivery
completed in 2000
Delivery began in 1999; 1400 delivered
as of 2006
Delivered between 2000 and 2003
Some intended for SAR; Delivery
completed between 2000 and 2001
Delivered between 2002 and 2003
Delivery completed between 2003 and
2006; 3 Su-25UBK and 3 Su-25T
As of 2005, one upgraded; no evidence
that Klub-S has been installed/transferred
$700 million (part of $1.4 billion deal)
Deliveries began by November/
December 2006; Completed by 2007
Deliveries began by November/
December 2006; Completed by 2007
Delivered 2006; to arm ex-Iraqi Air
Force and newly-acquired Su-25s
To outfit/upgrade U.S.-made F-5s and
Iranian variants (Azarakhsh & Saeqeh)

Most of this diagram is from Tor Bukkvoll's article, "Arming the Ayatollahs." All other additions are
from the SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, "Iranian Imports," Generated June 11, 2007.
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Appendix B: Russian Entities Suspected of Assisting Iran's Ballistic Missile Program 1997-1998 265
Entity

Alleged Activity

Baltic State Technical University

Training of Iranian personnel

Bauman Technical University

Training of Iranian personnel
Attempted transfer of special
steel via Azerbaijan
Facilitated travel of Russian
specialists to Iran
_j
Transferred dual-use missile
production technology
Transferred graphite ablative
materials to Iran
Transferred special mirrors,
composite materials, foils, and
metals to Iran
Missile specialists traveled to Iran
under false documents
Attempted transfer of special
steel via Azerbaijan

Europalas 2000
Federal Security Service (FSB)
Glavkosmos
Grafit Research Institute
INOR Scientific Centre
Kominterm Plant (Novosibirsk)
MOSO Company
Moscow Aviation Institute
NPO Energomash

NPO Trud

Polyus Science and Research

Russian Space Agency

Rosvoorouzhenie Arms Export
Agency
Tikhomirov Institute
TsAGI Central
Aerohydrodynamic Institute

Training of Iranian personnel
Transferred SS-4 engine
technology
Transferred engine components,
documentation, and engine test
equipment; contracted to
manufacture engine turbo pumps
Transferred missile guidance
technology and assisted with
design of Shahab-3 guidance
package
According to Israeli Intelligence,
Director Yuri Koptev facilitated
technology transfers
According to Israeli intelligence,
recruited Russians to assist
Iranians and facilitated several
technology transfers
Unclear
Contracted to build wind tunnel;
transferred model 1998)

Action Taken
Denied US funding (March
1998), sanctioned by the United
States (July 1998)
Sanctioned by the United States
(July 1998)

Sanctioned by the United States
(July 1998)
Sanctioned by the United States
(July 1998)
Sanctioned by the United States
(July 1998), restrictions lifted
(April 2000)
Suspicions not substantiated,
sanctions not imposed
Sanctioned by the United States
(July 1998)
Denied US funding (March 1998)
sanctioned by the United States
(January 1999)
Suspicions not substantiated
Lattermost effort thwarted; no
recent signs of activity with Iran
Sanctioned by the United States
(July 1998), restrictions lifted
(April 2000)

Suspicions not substantiated,
sanctions not imposed
Denied US funding (March 1998)
no recent signs of activity with
Iran

Col. Eas Bokhari (ret.), "Russian Arms & Technology transfers to Iran," defencejournal.com,
http://www.defenceiounial.com/200l/august/russians.htm (accessed July 29, 2008).
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Appendix C: Acronyms
ASCM
ATGM
CAS
CIA
CIS
CMTC
COCOM
ECM
EU
FMA
FSB
FSU
FS VTS
IAEA
IRGC
IFV
KGB
MANPADS
MBT
MIC
MiG
MTCR
MTC
NATO
NPT
P-5
R&D
SAM
SEAD
SHORAD
SLV
Su
SRAAM
SVR
UAV
UN
UNSC
USA
USSR

Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
Anti-Tank Guided Missile
Close Air-Support
Central Intelligence Agency
Commonwealth of Independent States
Committee for Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control
Electronic Countermeasures
European Union
Foreign Military Assistance
Russian Federal Security Service
Former Soviet Union Republic
Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation
International Atomic Energy Agency
Iranian Revolutionary Guards Court
Infantry Fighting Vehicle
Committee for State Security (English Translation)
Man-Portable Air Defense System
Main Battle Tank
Military-Industrial Complex
Mikoyan-Gurevich (Russian Aerospace Company)
Missile Technology Control Regime
Military-Technical Cooperation
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council
Research and Development
Surface-to-Air-Missile
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
Short-Range Air-Defense System
Satellite Launch Vehicle
Sukhoi (Russian Aerospace Company)
Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
United Nations
United Nations Security Council
United States of America
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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